Letter 113

[1] You want me to write you what I think about this question that is bandied about among our school: whether justice, courage, prudence, and the other virtues are living creatures. By such fine-spun subtlety, my dearest Lucilius, we have brought it about that we seem to exercise our wits among trifles and to waste our leisure on disputations that will do no good. I will do what you want and set forth what our people think; but I declare that I hold a different view. I think that there are certain things that befit a man in white slippers and a Greek cloak [i.e. fit for a parading philosopher rather than a serious one]. So I will tell you what the arguments are that moved the ancients, or rather what the questions are that the ancients stirred up. [2] It is agreed that the mind is a living creature, since it is the very thing that makes us living creatures, since it is from the mind that living creatures have drawn this name. Now virtue is nothing other than the mind disposed in a certain way; therefore it is a living creature. Next, virtue does something; but nothing can be done without impulse; if it has impulse, which belongs to nothing except a living creature, it is a living creature. [3] "If virtue is a living creature," says someone, "then it itself possesses virtue." Why should it not possess its own self? Just as the wise man does everything by means of virtue, so virtue does everything by means of itself. "Therefore," he says, "all the arts too are living creatures, and so is everything we think and everything we grasp with the mind. It follows that many thousands of living creatures dwell in this narrow space of the breast, and that each of us individually is many living creatures, or has many living creatures within us." Do you ask what answer is to be made against this? Each single one of these things will be a living creature: they will not be many living creatures. Why? I will tell you, if you will lend me your subtlety and your concentration. [4] Individual living creatures must have individual substances; but all these things have one mind; and so they can be single, they cannot be many. I am both a living creature and a man, yet you will not say that there are two of us. Why? Because they must be separated. This is what I mean: the one must be drawn apart from the other so that there may be two. Whatever is manifold within a single thing falls under one nature; and so it is one. [5] Both my mind is a living creature and I am a living creature, yet we are not two. Why? Because the mind is a part of me. A thing will be counted by itself only when it stands by itself; but where it will be the member of another, it cannot be regarded as a separate thing. Why? I will tell you: because that which is a separate thing must be its own and proper and whole and complete within itself. [6] I have declared that I am of a different opinion; for not only will the virtues be living creatures, if this is accepted, but so too the vices opposed to them and the emotions, such as anger, fear, grief, suspicion. The matter will go further still: all opinions, all thoughts will be living creatures. This is in no way to be accepted; for not everything that is done by a man is a man. [7] "What is justice?" he asks. The mind disposed in a certain way. "And so if the mind is a living creature, justice is too." Not at all; for this is a condition of the mind and a certain power. The same mind is turned into various shapes, and it does not become a different living creature as often as it does something different; nor is that which is done by the mind a living creature. [8] If justice is a living creature, if courage is, if the other virtues are, do they cease from time to time to be living creatures and then begin again, or are they always living creatures? The virtues cannot cease. Therefore many living creatures, indeed countless ones, are at work in this one mind. [9] "They are not many," he says, "because they are bound together out of one, and are the parts and members of one thing." We are then picturing for ourselves a face of the mind such as that of the hydra, which has many heads, each one of which fights on its own and harms on its own. And yet none of those heads is a living creature, but the head of a living creature: and the hydra itself is one living creature. No one ever said that the lion in the Chimaera was a living creature, or the serpent: these were parts of it; but parts are not living creatures. [10] What is it from which you conclude that justice is a living creature? "It does something," he says, "and it benefits; but what does something and benefits has impulse; and what has impulse is a living creature." That is true, if it has its own impulse; but it does not have its own, but the mind's. [11] Every living creature, until it dies, is what it began as: a man, until he dies, is a man, a horse a horse, a dog a dog; it cannot pass over into something else. Justice, that is, the mind disposed in a certain way, is a living creature. Let us grant it: next, courage is a living creature, that is, the mind disposed in a certain way. Which mind? That one which a moment ago was justice? It is held fast in the earlier living creature; it is not permitted to pass over into another living creature; it must persevere in that in which it first began to be. [12] Besides, one mind cannot belong to two living creatures, much less to several. If justice, courage, temperance, and the other virtues are living creatures, how will they have one mind? They must have individual ones, or else they are not living creatures. [13] One body cannot belong to several living creatures. This they themselves admit. What is the body of justice? "The mind." What? What is the body of courage? "The same mind." And yet one body cannot belong to two living creatures. [14] "But the same mind," he says, "puts on the condition of justice, and of courage, and of temperance." This could happen if, at the time when there was justice, there were not courage, and at the time when there was courage, there were not temperance; but as it is, all the virtues exist at the same time. So how will the individual ones be living creatures, when there is one mind, which cannot make more than one living creature? [15] Finally, no living creature is a part of another living creature; but justice is a part of the mind; therefore it is not a living creature. I seem to myself to be wasting my labor on something already conceded; for one ought to be indignant about this rather than to dispute it. No living creature is equal to another. Look around at the bodies of all things: there is none that does not have both its own color and its own shape and its own size. [16] Among the other reasons why the genius of the divine craftsman is marvelous, I reckon this to be one too: that in so great an abundance of things he never fell upon the same thing twice; even things that seem alike, when you have compared them, are different. He made so many kinds of leaves: not one is unmarked by its own peculiar property; so many living creatures: not one's size agrees with another's, there is always some difference. He demanded of himself that things which were distinct should also be dissimilar and unequal. All the virtues, as you say, are equal; therefore they are not living creatures. [17] There is no living creature that does not act of itself; but virtue does nothing of itself, but together with man. All living creatures are either rational, like men, like gods, or irrational, like wild beasts, like cattle; the virtues are at any rate rational; and yet they are neither men nor gods; therefore they are not living creatures. [18] Every rational living creature does nothing unless it has first been stirred by the appearance of some thing, then has taken on impulse, then assent has confirmed this impulse. I will tell you what assent is. I ought to walk: only then do I walk, when I have said this to myself and approved this opinion of mine; I ought to sit: only then do I sit. This assent is not present in virtue. [19] For suppose it is prudence: how will it assent to "I ought to walk"? Nature does not allow this. For prudence looks out for the one to whom it belongs, not for itself; for it can neither walk nor sit. Therefore it does not have assent; and what does not have assent is not a rational living creature. If virtue is a living creature, it is rational; but it is not rational; therefore it is not a living creature either. [20] If virtue is a living creature, and virtue is every good, then every good is a living creature. This our people admit. To save a father is a good, and to state an opinion prudently in the senate is a good, and to decide justly is a good; therefore to save a father is a living creature, and to state an opinion prudently is a living creature. The matter has gone so far that you cannot hold back your laughter: to be silent prudently is a good, [... to dine is a good]; so both being silent and dining are living creatures. [21] I, by Hercules, will not stop tickling myself and making sport for myself out of these subtle inanities. Justice and courage, if they are living creatures, are certainly terrestrial; every terrestrial living creature gets cold, gets hungry, gets thirsty; therefore justice gets cold, courage gets hungry, clemency gets thirsty. [22] What next? Shall I not ask them what shape these living creatures have? That of a man, or a horse, or a wild beast? If they give them a round shape, such as they have given to god, I will ask whether greed too and luxury and madness are equally round; for these too are living creatures. If they have rounded these off as well, I will still ask whether prudent walking is a living creature. They must confess that it is, and then say that walking is a living creature, and a round one at that. [23] But so that you do not think that I am the first of our school not to speak from the prescribed doctrine but to follow my own opinion, Cleanthes and his pupil Chrysippus do not agree on what walking is. Cleanthes says it is breath transmitted from the ruling part [of the soul] all the way to the feet; Chrysippus says it is the ruling part itself. Why then, following the example of Chrysippus himself, should not each man claim himself for his own and laugh at these living creatures, so many that the world itself cannot hold them? [24] "The virtues are not many living creatures," he says, "and yet they are living creatures. For just as someone is both a poet and an orator, and yet is one man, so these virtues are living creatures but they are not many. The mind is the same, both mind and just and prudent and brave, being disposed in a certain way toward each of the virtues." [25] With [that objection] removed, we are in agreement. For I too admit for the moment that the mind is a living creature, intending to see later what view I will deliver on this matter: I deny that its actions are living creatures. Otherwise all words too will be living creatures and all verses. For if a prudent speech is a good, and every good is a living creature, then a speech is a living creature. A prudent line of verse is a good, and every good is a living creature; therefore a line of verse is a living creature. So "Arms and the man I sing" [the opening of Vergil's Aeneid] is a living creature, which they cannot call round, since it has six feet. [26] "This whole business that is being conducted right now," you say, "is, by Hercules, a tangled web." I burst with laughter when I imagine to myself that a solecism is a living creature, and a barbarism, and a syllogism, and like a painter I assign to them fitting faces. Is this what we debate with brows drawn together, with wrinkled forehead? At this point I cannot quote that line of Caelius: "O dreary trifles!" They are ridiculous. Why then do we not rather treat of something useful and wholesome for ourselves, and inquire how we may be able to arrive at the virtues, what path may lead us to them? [27] Teach me not whether courage is a living creature, but that no living creature is happy without courage, unless it has grown strong against the blows of chance and has subdued in advance, by rehearsing them, every mishap before it received it. What is courage? An impregnable fortification of human weakness, which the man who has surrounded himself with it endures untroubled in this siege of life; for he uses his own strength, his own weapons. [28] Here I want to relate to you the saying of our Posidonius: "There is no reason for you ever to think that you are safe by the weapons of Fortune: fight with your own. Fortune does not arm you against herself; and so men equipped against their enemies are unarmed against Fortune herself." [29] Alexander, to be sure, laid waste and put to flight the Persians and the Hyrcanians and the Indians and whatever nations the East extends all the way to the Ocean; but he himself, now having killed a friend, now having lost one, would lie in the dark, grieving sometimes for his crime, sometimes for his loss, the conqueror of so many kings and peoples succumbing to anger and sorrow; for he had so arranged matters that he had everything in his power rather than his own emotions. [30] Oh, by what great errors are men possessed, who long to extend their right of dominion across the seas, and judge themselves most fortunate if they hold many provinces with their soldiery and add new ones to the old, ignorant of what that immense kingdom is that is equal to the gods: to rule oneself is the greatest rule of all. [31] Let it [justice] teach me what a sacred thing justice is, which looks to another's good and seeks nothing for itself except the exercise of itself. Let it have nothing to do with ambition and reputation: let it be pleasing to itself. Let each man persuade himself of this before all else: it is fitting that I be just for nothing. That is too little. Let him further persuade himself of this: may it please me even to spend myself freely on this most beautiful virtue; let my whole thought be turned as far as possible away from private advantages. There is no reason for you to look to what the reward of a just deed may be: the greater reward is in the just deed itself. [32] Fix this further in your mind, what I was saying a little earlier, that it makes no difference to the matter how many people know of your fairness. The man who wants his virtue made public is not laboring for virtue but for glory. Are you not willing to be just without glory? But, by Hercules, you will often have to be just amid disgrace, and then, if you are wise, let the bad opinion that is well earned delight you. Farewell.

You wish me to write to you my opinion concerning this question, which has been mooted by our school—whether justice, courage, foresight, and the other virtues, are living things. By such niceties as this, my beloved Lucilius, we have made people think that we sharpen our wits on useless objects, and waste our leisure time in discussions that will be unprofitable. I shall, however, do as you ask, and shall set forth the subject as viewed by our school. For myself, I confess to another belief: I hold that there are certain things which befit a wearer of white shoes and a Greek mantle. But what the beliefs are that have stirred the ancients, or those which the ancients have stirred up for discussion, I shall explain to you. The soul, men are agreed, is a living thing, because of itself it can make us living things, and because “living things" have derived their name therefrom. But virtue is nothing else than a soul in a certain condition; therefore it is a living thing. Again, virtue is active, and no action can take place without impulse. And if a thing has impulse, it must be a living thing; for none except a living thing possesses impulse. A reply to this is: “If virtue is a living thing, then virtue itself possesses virtue.” Of course it possesses its own self! Just as the wise man does everything by reason of virtue, so virtue accomplishes everything by reason of itself. “In that case,” say they, “all the arts also are living things, and all our thoughts and all that the mind comprehends. It therefore follows that many thousands of living things dwell in man’s tiny heart, and that each individual among us consists of, or at least contains, many living beings.” Are you gravelled for an answer to this remark? Each of these will be a living thing; but they will not be many separate living things. And why? I shall explain, if you will apply your subtlety and your concentration to my words. Each living thing must have a separate substance; but since all the things mentioned above have a single soul, consequently they can be separate living things but without plurality. I myself am a living thing, and a man; but you cannot say that there are two of me for that reason. And why? Because, if that were so, they would have to be two separate existences. This is what I mean: one would have to be sundered from the other so as to produce two. But whenever you have that which is manifold in one whole, it falls into the category of a single nature, and is therefore single. My soul is a living thing, and so am I; but we are not two separate persons. And why? Because the soul is part of myself. It will only be reckoned as a definite thing in itself, when it shall exist by itself. But as long as it shall be part of another, it cannot be regarded as different. And why? I will tell you: it is because that which is different, must be personal and peculiar to itself, a whole, and complete within itself. I myself have gone on record as being of a different opinion; for if one adopts this belief, not only the virtues will be living things, but so will their contrary vices, and the emotions, like wrath, fear, grief, and suspicion. Nay, the argument will carry us still further—all opinions and all thoughts will be living things. This is by no means admissible; since anything that man does is not necessarily the man himself. “What is Justice?” people say. Justice is a soul that maintains itself in a certain attitude. “Then if the soul is a living being, so is Justice.” By no means. For Justice is really a state, a kind of power, of the soul; and this same soul is transformed into various likenesses and does not become a different kind of living thing as often as it acts differently. Nor is the result of soul-action a living thing. If Justice, Bravery, and the other virtues have actual life, do they cease to be living things and then begin life over again, or are they always living things? But the virtues cannot cease to be. Therefore, there are many, nay countless, living things, sojourning in this one soul. “No,” is the answer, “not many, because they are all attached to the one, being parts and members of a single whole.” We are then portraying for ourselves an image of the soul like that of a many-headed hydra—each separate head fighting and destroying independently. And yet there is no separate living thing to each head; it is the head of a living thing, and the hydra itself is one single living thing. No one ever believed that the Chimaera contained a living lion or a living serpent; these were merely parts of the whole Chimaera; and parts are not living things. Then how can you infer that Justice is a living thing? “Justice,” people reply, “is active and helpful; that which acts and is helpful, possesses impulse; and that which possesses impulse is a living thing.” True, if the impulse is its own; (but in the case of justice it is not its own;) the impulse comes from the soul. Every living thing exists as it began, until death; a man, until he dies, is a man, a horse is a horse, a dog a dog. They cannot change into anything else. Now let us grant that Justice—which is defined as “a soul in a certain attitude,” is a living thing. Let us suppose this to be so. Then Bravery also is alive, being “a soul in a certain attitude.” But which soul? That which was but now defined as Justice? The soul is kept within the first-named being, and cannot cross over into another; it must last out its existence in the medium where it had its origin. Besides, there cannot be one soul to two living things, much less to many living things. And if Justice, Bravery, Restraint, and all the other virtues, are living things, how will they have one soul? They must possess separate souls, or else they are not living things. Several living things cannot have one body; this is admitted by our very opponents. Now what is the “body” of justice? “The soul,” they admit. And of bravery? “The soul also.” And yet there cannot be one body of two living things. “The same soul, however,” they answer, “assumes the guise of Justice, or Bravery, or Restraint.” This would be possible if Bravery were absent when Justice was present, and if Restraint were absent when Bravery was present; as the case stands now, all the virtues exist at the same time. Hence, how can the separate virtues be living things, if you grant that there is one single soul, which cannot create more than one single living thing? Again, no living thing is part of another living thing. But Justice is a part of the soul; therefore Justice is not a living thing. It looks as if I were wasting time over something that is an acknowledged fact; for one ought to decry such a topic rather than debate it. And no two living things are equal. Consider the bodies of all beings: every one has its particular colour, shape, and size. And among the other reasons for marvelling at the genius of the Divine Creator is, I believe, this,—that amid all this abundance there is no repetition; even seemingly similar things are, on comparison, unlike. God has created all the great number of leaves that we behold: each, however, is stamped with its special pattern. All the many animals: none resembles another in size—always some difference! The Creator has set himself the task of making unlike and unequal things that are different; but all the virtues, as your argument states, are equal. Therefore, they are not living things. Every living thing acts of itself; but virtue does nothing of itself; it must act in conjunction with man. All living things either are gifted with reason, like men and gods, or else are irrational, like beasts and cattle. Virtues, in any case, are rational; and yet they are neither men nor gods; therefore they are not living things. Every living thing possessed of reason is inactive if it is not first stirred by some external impression; then the impulse comes, and finally assent confirms the impulse. Now what assent is, I shall explain. Suppose that I ought to take a walk: I do walk, but only after uttering the command to myself and approving this opinion of mine. Or suppose that I ought to seat myself; I do seat myself, but only after the same process. This assent is not a part of virtue. For let us suppose that it is Prudence; how will Prudence assent to the opinion: “I must take a walk”? Nature does not allow this. For Prudence looks after the interests of its possessor, and not of its own self. Prudence cannot walk or be seated. Accordingly, it does not possess the power of assent, and it is not a living thing possessed of reason. But if virtue is a living thing, it is rational. But it is not rational; therefore it is not a living thing. If virtue is a living thing, and virtue is a Good—is not, then, every Good a living thing? It is. Our school professes it. Now to save a father’s life is a Good; it is also a Good to pronounce one’s opinion judiciously in the senate, and it is a Good to hand down just opinions; therefore the act of saving a father’s life is a living thing, also the act of pronouncing judicious opinions. We have carried this absurd argument so far that you cannot keep from laughing outright: wise silence is a Good, and so is a frugal dinner; therefore silence and dining are living things. Indeed I shall never cease to tickle my mind and to make sport for myself by means of this nice nonsense. Justice and Bravery, if they are living things, are certainly of the earth. Now every earthly living thing gets cold or hungry or thirsty; therefore, Justice goes a-cold, Bravery is hungry, and Kindness craves a drink! And what next? Should I not ask our honourable opponents what shape these living beings have? Is it that of man, or horse, or wild beast? If they are given a round shape, like that of a god, I shall ask whether greed and luxury and madness are equally round. For these, too, are “living things.” If I find that they give a rounded shape to these also, I shall go so far as to ask whether a modest gait is a living thing; they must admit it, according to their argument, and proceed to say that a gait is a living thing, and a rounded living thing, at that! Now do not imagine that I am the first one of our school who does not speak from rules but has his own opinion: Cleanthes and his pupil Chrysippus could not agree in defining the act of walking. Cleanthes held that it was spirit transmitted to the feet from the primal essence, while Chrysippus maintained that it was the primal essence in itself. Why, then, following the example of Chrysippus himself, should not every man claim his own freedom, and laugh down all these “living things,”—so numerous that the universe itself cannot contain them? One might say: “The virtues are not many living things, and yet they are living things. For just as an individual may be both poet and orator in one, even so these virtues are living things, but they are not many. The soul is the same; it can be at the same time just and prudent and brave, maintaining itself in a certain attitude towards each virtue.” The dispute is settled, and we are therefore agreed. For I shall admit, meanwhile, that the soul is a living thing with the proviso that later on I may cast my final vote; but I deny that the acts of the soul are living beings. Otherwise, all words and all verses would be alive; for if prudent speech is a Good, and every Good a living thing, then speech is a living thing. A prudent line of poetry is a Good; everything alive is a Good; therefore, the line of poetry is a living thing. And so “Arms and the man I sing,” is a living thing; but they cannot call it rounded, because it has six feet! “This whole proposition,” you say, “which we are at this moment discussing, is a puzzling fabric.” I split with laughter whenever I reflect that solecisms and barbarisms and syllogisms are living things, and, like an artist, I give to each a fitting likeness. Is this what we discuss with contracted brow and wrinkled forehead? I cannot say now, after Caelius, “What melancholy trifling!” It is more than this; it is absurd. Why do we not rather discuss something which is useful and wholesome to ourselves, seeking how we may attain the virtues, and finding the path which will take us in that direction? Teach me, not whether Bravery be a living thing, but prove that no living thing is happy without bravery, that is, unless it has grown strong to oppose hazards and has overcome all the strokes of chance by rehearsing and anticipating their attack. And what is Bravery? It is the impregnable fortress for our mortal weakness; when a man has surrounded himself therewith, he can hold out free from anxiety during life’s siege; for he is using his own strength and his own weapons. At this point I would quote you a saying of our philosopher Posidonius: “There are never any occasions when you need think yourself safe because you wield the weapons of Fortune; fight with your own! Fortune does not furnish arms against herself; hence men equipped against their foes are unarmed against Fortune herself.” Alexander, to be sure, harried and put to flight the Persians, the Hyrcanians, the Indians, and all the other races that the Orient spreads even to the Ocean; but he himself, as he slew one friend or lost another, would lie in the darkness lamenting sometimes his crime, and sometimes his loss; he, the conqueror of so many kings and nations, was laid low by anger and grief! For he had made it his aim to win control over everything except his emotions. Oh with what great mistakes are men obsessed, who desire to push their limits of empire beyond the seas, who judge themselves most prosperous when they occupy many provinces with their soldiery and join new territory to the old! Little do they know of that kingdom which is on an equality with the heavens in greatness! Self-Command is the greatest command of all. Let her teach me what a hallowed thing is the Justice which ever regards another’s good and seeks nothing for itself except its own employment. It should have nothing to do with ambition and reputation; it should satisfy itself. Let each man convince himself of this before all else—“I must be just without reward.” And that is not enough; let him convince himself also of this: “May I take pleasure in devoting myself of my own free will to uphold this noblest of virtues.” Let all his thoughts be turned as far as possible from personal interests. You need not look about for the reward of a just deed; a just deed in itself offers a still greater return. Fasten deep in your mind that which I remarked a short space above: that it makes no difference how many persons are acquainted with your uprightness. Those who wish their virtue to be advertised are not striving for virtue but for renown. Are you not willing to be just without being renowned? Nay, indeed you must often be just and be at the same time disgraced. And then, if you are wise, let ill repute, well won, be a delight. Farewell.

[1] Desideras tibi scribi a me quid sentiam de hac quaestione iactata apud nostros, an iustitia, fortitudo, prudentia ceteraeque virtutes animalia sint. Hac subtilitate effecimus, Lucili carissime, ut exercere ingenium inter inrita videremur et disputationibus nihil profuturis otium terere. Faciam quod desideras et quid nostris videatur exponam; sed me in alia esse sententia profiteor: puto quaedam esse quae deceant phaecasiatum palliatumque. Quae sint ergo quae antiquos moverint vel quae sint quae antiqui moverint dicam. [2] Animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat ut simus animalia, cum ab illo animalia nomen hoc traxerint; virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens; ergo animal est. Deinde virtus agit aliquid; agi autem nihil sine impetu potest; si impetum habet, qui nulli est nisi animali, animal est. [3] 'Si animal est' inquit 'virtus, habet ipsa virtutem.' Quidni habeat se ipsam? quomodo sapiens omnia per virtutem gerit, sic virtus per se. 'Ergo' inquit 'et omnes artes animalia sunt et omnia quae cogitamus quaeque mente conplectimur. Sequitur ut multa millia animalium habitent in his angustiis pectoris, et singuli multa simus animalia aut multa habeamus animalia.' Quaeris quid adversus istud respondeatur? Unaquaeque ex istis res animal erit: multa animalia non erunt. Quare? dicam, si mihi accommodaveris subtilitatem et intentionem tuam. [4] Singula animalia singulas habere debent substantias; ista omnia unum animum habent; itaque singula esse possunt, multa esse non possunt. Ego et animal sum et homo, non tamen duos esse nos dices. Quare? quia separati debent esse. Ita dico: alter ab altero debet esse diductus ut duo sint. Quidquid in uno multiplex est sub unam naturam cadit; itaque unum est. [5] Et animus meus animal est et ego animal sum, duo tamen non sumus. Quare? quia animus mei pars est. Tunc aliquid per se numerabitur cum per se stabit; ubi vero alterius membrum erit, non poterit videri aliud. Quare? dicam: quia quod aliud est suum oportet esse et proprium et totum et intra se absolutum. [6] Ego in alia esse me sententia professus sum; non enim tantum virtutes animalia erunt, si hoc recipitur, sed opposita quoque illis vitia et adfectus, tamquam ira, timor, luctus, suspicio. Ultra res ista procedet: omnes sententiae, omnes cogitationes animalia erunt. Quod nullo modo recipiendum est; non enim quidquid ab homine fit homo est. [7] 'Iustitia quid est?' inquit. Animus quodam modo se habens. 'Itaque si animus animal est, et iustitia.' Minime; haec enim habitus animi est et quaedam vis. Idem animus in varias figuras convertitur et non totiens animal aliud est quotiens aliud facit; nec illud quod fit ab animo animal est. [8] <Si> iustitia animal est, <si> fortitudo, si ceterae virtutes, utrum desinunt esse animalia subinde aut rursus incipiunt, an semper sunt? desinere virtutes non possunt. Ergo multa animalia, immo innumerabilia, in hoc animo versantur. [9] 'Non sunt' inquit 'multa, quia ex uno religata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt.' Talem ergo faciem animi nobis proponimus qualis est hydrae multa habentis capita, quorum unumquodque per se pugnat, per se nocet. Atqui nullum ex illis capitibus animal est, sed animalis caput: ceterum ipsa unum animal est. Nemo in Chimaera leonem animal esse dixit aut draconem: hae partes erant eius; partes autem non sunt animalia. [10] Quid est quo colligas iustitiam animal esse? 'Agit' inquit 'aliquid et prodest; quod autem agit et prodest impetum habet; <quod autem impetum habet> animal est.' Verum est si suum impetum habet; <suum autem non habet> sed animi. [11] Omne animal donec moriatur id est quod coepit: homo donec moriatur homo est, equus equus, canis canis; transire in aliud non potest. Iustitia, id est animus quodam modo se habens, animal est. Credamus: deinde animal est fortitudo, id est animus quodam modo se habens. Quis animus? ille qui modo iustitia erat? Tenetur in priore animali, in aliud animal transire ei non licet; in eo illi in quo primum esse coepit perseverandum est. [12] Praeterea unus animus duorum esse animalium non potest, multo minus plurium. Si iustitia, fortitudo, temperantia ceteraeque virtutes animalia sunt, quomodo unum animum habebunt? singulos habeant oportet, aut non sunt animalia. [13] Non potest unum corpus plurium animalium esse. Hoc et ipsi fatentur. Iustitiae quod est corpus? 'Animus'. Quid? fortitudinis quod est corpus? 'Idem animus'. Atqui unum corpus esse duorum animalium non potest. [14] 'Sed idem animus' inquit 'iustitiae habitum induit et fortitudinis et temperantiae.' Hoc fieri posset si quo tempore iustitia esset fortitudo non esset, quo tempore fortitudo esset temperantia non esset; nunc vero omnes virtutes simul sunt. Ita quomodo singulae erunt animalia, cum unus animus sit, qui plus quam unum animal non potest facere? [15] Denique nullum animal pars est alterius animalis; iustitia autem pars est animi; non est ergo animal. Videor mihi in re confessa perdere operam; magis enim indignandum de isto quam disputandum est. Nullum animal alteri par est. Circumspice omnium corpora: nulli non et color proprius est et figura sua et magnitudo. [16] Inter cetera propter quae mirabile divini artificis ingenium est hoc quoque existimo esse, quod in tanta copia rerum numquam in idem incidit; etiam quae similia videntur, cum contuleris, diversa sunt. Tot fecit genera foliorum: nullum non sua proprietate signatum; tot animalia: nullius magnitudo cum altero convenit, utique aliquid interest. Exegit a se ut quae alia erant et dissimilia essent et inparia. Virtutes omnes, ut dicitis, pares sunt; ergo non sunt animalia. [17] Nullum non animal per se agit; virtus autem per se nihil agit, sed cum homine. Omnia animalia aut rationalia sunt, ut homines, ut dii, <aut inrationalia, ut ferae, ut pecora>; virtutes utique rationales sunt; atqui nec homines sunt nec dii; ergo non sunt animalia. [18] Omne rationale animal nihil agit nisi primum specie alicuius rei inritatum est, deinde impetum cepit, deinde adsensio confirmavit hunc impetum. Quid sit adsensio dicam. Oportet me ambulare: tunc demum ambulo cum hoc mihi dixi et adprobavi hanc opinionem meam; oportet me sedere: tunc demum sedeo. Haec adsensio in virtute non est. [19] Puta enim prudentiam esse: quomodo adsentietur 'oportet me ambulare'? Hoc natura non recipit. Prudentia enim ei cuius est prospicit, non sibi; nam nec ambulare potest nec sedere. Ergo adsensionem non habet; quod adsensionem non habet rationale animal non est. Virtus si animal est, rationale est; rationale autem non est; ergo nec animal. [20] Si virtus animal est, virtus autem bonum omnest, omne bonum animal est. Hoc nostri fatentur. Patrem servare bonum est, et sententiam prudenter in senatu dicere bonum est, et iuste decernere bonum est; ergo et patrem servare animal est et prudenter sententiam dicere animal est. Eo usque res ~exegit~ ut risum tenere non possis: prudenter tacere bonum est, <* * * cenare bonum est>; ita et tacere et cenare animal est. [21] Ego mehercules titillare non desinam et ludos mihi ex istis subtilibus ineptiis facere. Iustitia et fortitudo, si animalia sunt, certe terrestria sunt; omne animal terrestre alget, esurit, sitit; ergo iustitia alget, fortitudo esurit, clementia sitit. [22] Quid porro? non interrogabo illos quam figuram habeant ista animalia? hominis an equi an ferae? Si rotundam illis qualem deo dederint, quaeram an et avaritia et luxuria et dementia aeque rotundae sint; sunt enim et ipsae animalia. Si has quoque conrotundaverint, etiamnunc interrogabo an prudens ambulatio animal sit. Necesse est confiteantur, deinde dicant ambulationem animal esse et quidem rotundum. [23] Ne putes autem primum <me> ex nostris non ex praescripto loqui sed meae sententiae esse, inter Cleanthen et discipulum eius Chrysippum non convenit quid sit ambulatio. Cleanthes ait spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum, Chrysippus ipsum principale. Quid est ergo cur non ipsius Chrysippi exemplo sibi quisque se vindicet et ista tot animalia quot mundus ipse non potest capere derideat? [24] 'Non sunt' inquit 'virtutes multa animalia, et tamen animalia sunt. Nam quemadmodum aliquis et poeta est et orator, et tamen unus, sic virtutes istae animalia sunt sed multa non sunt. Idem est animus et animus et iustus et prudens et fortis, ad singulas virtutes quodam modo se habens.' [25] Sublata * * * convenit nobis. Nam et ego interim fateor animum animal esse, postea visurus quam de ista re sententiam feram: actiones eius animalia esse nego. Alioqui et omnia verba erunt animalia et omnes versus. Nam si prudens sermo bonum est, bonum autem omne animal est, <sermo animal est>. Prudens versus bonum est, bonum autem omne animal est; versus ergo animal est. Ita animal est, quod non possunt rotundum dicere cum sex pedes habeat. [26] 'Textorium' inquis 'totum mehercules istud quod cum maxime agitur.' Dissilio risu cum mihi propono soloecismum animal esse et barbarismum et syllogismum et aptas illis facies tamquam pictor adsigno. Haec disputamus attractis superciliis, fronte rugosa? Non possum hoc loco dicere illud Caelianum: 'o tristes ineptias!' Ridiculae sunt. Quin itaque potius aliquid utile nobis ac salutare tractamus et quaerimus quomodo ad virtutes pervenire possimus, quae nos ad illas via adducat? [27] Doce me non an fortitudo animal sit, sed nullum animal felix esse sine fortitudine, nisi contra fortuita convaluit et omnis casus antequam exciperet meditando praedomuit. Quid est fortitudo? Munimentum humanae imbecillitatis inexpugnabile, quod qui circumdedit sibi securus in hac vitae obsidione perdurat; utitur enim suis viribus, suis telis. [28] Hoc loco tibi Posidonii nostri referre sententiam volo: 'non est quod umquam fortunae armis putes esse te tutum: tuis pugna. Contra ipsam fortuna non armat; itaque contra hostes instructi, contra ipsam inermes sunt.' [29] Alexander Persas quidem et Hyrcanos et Indos et quidquid gentium usque in oceanum extendit oriens vastabat fugabatque, sed ipse modo occiso amico, modo amisso, iacebat in tenebris, alias scelus, alias desiderium suum maerens, victor tot regum atque populorum irae tristitiaeque succumbens; id enim egerat ut omnia potius haberet in potestate quam adfectus. [30] O quam magnis homines tenentur erroribus qui ius dominandi trans maria cupiunt permittere felicissimosque se iudicant si multas [pro] milite provincias obtinent et novas veteribus adiungunt, ignari quod sit illud ingens parque dis regnum: imperare sibi maximum imperium est. [31] Doceat me quam sacra res sit iustitia alienum bonum spectans, nihil ex se petens nisi usum sui. Nihil sit illi cum ambitione famaque: sibi placeat. Hoc ante omnia sibi quisque persuadeat: me iustum esse gratis oportet. Parum est. Adhuc illud persuadeat sibi: me in hanc pulcherrimam virtutem ultro etiam inpendere iuvet; tota cogitatio a privatis commodis quam longissime aversa sit. Non est quod spectes quod sit iustae rei praemium: maius in iusto est. [32] Illud adhuc tibi adfige quod paulo ante dicebam, nihil ad rem pertinere quam multi aequitatem tuam noverint. Qui virtutem suam publicari vult non virtuti laborat sed gloriae. Non vis esse iustus sine gloria? at mehercules saepe iustus esse debebis cum infamia, et tunc, si sapis, mala opinio bene parta delectet. Vale.