Lucius Munatius Plancus→Marcus Tullius Cicero|c. 43 BC|Cicero|From Gaul|To Rome|AI-assisted
What I had in mind when Laevus and Nerva left me you could learn both from the letter I gave them and from the men themselves, who had taken part in all my actions and plans. What has happened to me is what usually happens to a prudent man who wants to satisfy the republic and all loyal citizens: I followed a course that was more dangerous, because it would prove my loyalty, instead of a safer one that might have exposed me to criticism.
After the envoys left, Lepidus sent two letters in succession asking me to come. Laterensis pressed me even more strongly, almost begging me, fearing nothing except the same thing that frightens me: the variability and unreliability of Lepidus' army. I thought I must not hesitate to help and to expose myself to the common danger.
I knew the safer plan was to wait at the Isara until Brutus brought his army across, and then to go against the enemy with a colleague who agreed with me and with soldiers who, like his, were loyal. Still, if Lepidus, while well disposed, suffered some disaster, I saw that all of it would be assigned either to my stubbornness or to my fear: either because I had failed to support a man who, though personally at odds with me, was joined to the republic, or because I had kept myself away from the struggle in a war so necessary.
So I preferred to take the risk, if by my presence I could protect Lepidus and improve his army, rather than seem too cautious. I do not think anyone has ever been more anxious through no fault of his own. If Lepidus' army were absent, this matter would leave no doubt; as things are, it brings great anxiety and great risk. If it had fallen to me to meet Antony first, he would not, by Hercules, have stood his ground for an hour. I have that much confidence in myself, and I hold his shattered forces and the camp of Ventidius the muleteer in that much contempt.
But I cannot help shuddering if there is some wound hidden beneath the skin, one that can do harm before it is recognized and treated. Certainly, unless I held myself in one place, Lepidus himself and the loyal part of his army would face great danger. The desperate enemy would also gain a large reinforcement if they drew any troops away from Lepidus. If my arrival has prevented that, I will thank fortune and my own steadiness, which roused me to make this test.
So on May 21 I moved camp from the Isara. Still, I left the bridge I had built over the river, with two forts placed at its ends, and I stationed strong garrisons there, so that Brutus and his army would have a crossing ready without delay when they arrived. I myself hope to join Lepidus' forces within eight days of sending this letter.
DCCCLXVI (Fam. X, 18) L. MUNATIUS PLANCUS TO CICERO (AT ROME) GAUL, 18 MAY: WHAT I had in my mind when Laevus and Nerva quitted me you have been able to ascertain by the letter which I forwarded by them and from these men personally, who have taken part in all my actions and consultations- There has happened to me what usually does happen to a man of honour and one who is desirous of doing his duty to the state, in fact to all good men, that I preferred to pursue a dangerous course with an approving conscience, rather than a safe one which might lay me open to some reproach. Accordingly, after the departure of his legates, as Lepidus in two successive letters begged me to join him, and Laterensis still more strongly begged me to do so in terms almost of entreaty-showing no dread of anything except what causes me also some alarm, the fickleness and untrustworthy temper of his army — I thought I ought not to hesitate about hurrying to his assistance and confronting the common danger. Now the safe course for me was to wait on the Isara till Dec. Brutus got his army across the mountains, and to go to meet the enemy with a colleague in sympathy with my views and an army in full accord and well-affected to the had not opposed Antony 's passage, and indeed seems to have joined him (App. B.C. 3.83). Republic, as his soldiers are. Nevertheless I knew that if Lepidus while entertaining loyal ideas came to any harm, it would all be laid to the charge either of my obstinacy or my timidity. I saw plainly that this would' be so, if I either failed to relieve a man closely united with the Republic, though on bad terms with myself, or had myself withdrawn from the struggle in a war of such moment. So I preferred to run the risk, and to see whether my presence might afford Lepidus protection and render his army better-affected, rather than appear over-cautious. At any rate I think there never was anyone more anxious, without any fault of his own, than myself. For the very situation which was causing me no hesitation, supposing Lepidus 's army away, in the present state of things brings me great anxiety and involves great risk. For if it had been my fortune to encounter Antony first, he would not, by heaven, have held his ground an hour. So confident do I feel in myself and so completely do I despise his demoralized forces and the division of Ventidius the mule-man. But I cannot but shudder at the idea of some hidden wound, which may cause mischief before it can be known and treated. But certainly unless I had remained on the same ground Lepidus himself and the well-affected part of his army would have incurred great danger. The unscrupulous enemy also would have secured a great accession of force, if they had withdrawn any of his troops from Lepidus . And if my arrival has stopped these things occurring I shall thank my stars and my own firmness, which incited me to make this experiment. Therefore on the 20th of May I broke up my camp on the Isara : I left the bridge standing, however, which I had constructed over that river, with a fort placed at each end of it; and in them I stationed strong garrisons, that there might be a means of crossing without delay ready for Brutus and his army when he came. I shall myself, I hope, in eight days from the despatch of this letter effect a junction with the forces of Lepidus .
XVIII. Scr. in castris XII. Kal. Iunias a.u.c. 711. PLANCUS CICERONI.
Quid in animo habuerim, cum Laevus Nervaque discesserunt a me, et ex litteris, quas eis dedi, et ex ipsis cognoscere potuisti, qui omnibus rebus consiliisque meis interfuerunt. Accidit mihi, quod homini prudenti et cupido satisfaciendi rei publicae bonisque omnibus accidere solet, ut consilium sequerer periculosum magis, dum me probarem, quam tutum, quod habere posset obtrectationem. Itaque post discessum legatorum, cum binis continuis litteris et Lepidus me, ut venirem, rogaret, et Laterensis multo etiam magis prope implorans obtestaretur non ullam rem aliam extimescens quam eandem, quae mihi quoque facit timorem, varietatem atque infidelitatem exercitus eius, non dubitandum putavi, quin succurrerem meque communi periculo offerrem; sciebam enim, etsi cautius illud erat consilium, exspectare me ad Isaram, dum Brutus traiiceret exercitum, et cum collega consentiente, sicut milites faciunt, hostibus obviam ire, tamen, si quid Lepidus bene sentiens detrimenti cepisset, hoc omne assignatum iri aut pertinaciae meae aut timori videbam, si aut hominem offensum mihi, coniunctum cum re publica non sublevassem aut ipse a certamine belli tam necessarii me removissem. Itaque potius periclitari volui, si possem mea praesentia et Lepidum tueri et exercitum facere meliorem, quam nimis cautus videri; sollicitiorem certe hominem, non suis contractis, neminem puto fuisse; nam, quae res nullam habebat dubitationem, si exercitus Lepidi abesset, ea nunc magnam affert sollicitudinem magnumque habet casum; mihi enim si contigisset, ut prior occurrerem Antonio, non mehercules horam constitisset: tantum ego et mihi confido et sic perculsas illius copias Ventidiique mulionis castra despicio; sed non possum non exhorrescere, si quid intra cutem subest vulneris, quod prius nocere potest, quam sciri curarique possit. Sed certe, nisi uno loco me tenerem, magnum periculum ipse Lepidus, magnum ea pars exercitus adiret, quae bene de re publica sentit; magnam etiam perditi hostes accessionem sibi fecissent, si quas copias a Lepido abstraxissent: quae si adventus meus represserit, agam gratias fortunae constantiaeque meae, quae ad hanc experientiam me excitavit. Itaque a. d. XII. Kalend. Iun. ab Isara castra movi; pontem tamen, quem in Isara feceram, castellis duobus ad capita positis reliqui praesidiaque ibi firma posui, ut venienti Bruto exercituique eius sine mora transitus esset paratus. Ipse, ut spero, diebus octo, quibus has litteras dabam, cum Lepidi copiis me coniungam.
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What I had in mind when Laevus and Nerva left me you could learn both from the letter I gave them and from the men themselves, who had taken part in all my actions and plans. What has happened to me is what usually happens to a prudent man who wants to satisfy the republic and all loyal citizens: I followed a course that was more dangerous, because it would prove my loyalty, instead of a safer one that might have exposed me to criticism.
After the envoys left, Lepidus sent two letters in succession asking me to come. Laterensis pressed me even more strongly, almost begging me, fearing nothing except the same thing that frightens me: the variability and unreliability of Lepidus' army. I thought I must not hesitate to help and to expose myself to the common danger.
I knew the safer plan was to wait at the Isara until Brutus brought his army across, and then to go against the enemy with a colleague who agreed with me and with soldiers who, like his, were loyal. Still, if Lepidus, while well disposed, suffered some disaster, I saw that all of it would be assigned either to my stubbornness or to my fear: either because I had failed to support a man who, though personally at odds with me, was joined to the republic, or because I had kept myself away from the struggle in a war so necessary.
So I preferred to take the risk, if by my presence I could protect Lepidus and improve his army, rather than seem too cautious. I do not think anyone has ever been more anxious through no fault of his own. If Lepidus' army were absent, this matter would leave no doubt; as things are, it brings great anxiety and great risk. If it had fallen to me to meet Antony first, he would not, by Hercules, have stood his ground for an hour. I have that much confidence in myself, and I hold his shattered forces and the camp of Ventidius the muleteer in that much contempt.
But I cannot help shuddering if there is some wound hidden beneath the skin, one that can do harm before it is recognized and treated. Certainly, unless I held myself in one place, Lepidus himself and the loyal part of his army would face great danger. The desperate enemy would also gain a large reinforcement if they drew any troops away from Lepidus. If my arrival has prevented that, I will thank fortune and my own steadiness, which roused me to make this test.
So on May 21 I moved camp from the Isara. Still, I left the bridge I had built over the river, with two forts placed at its ends, and I stationed strong garrisons there, so that Brutus and his army would have a crossing ready without delay when they arrived. I myself hope to join Lepidus' forces within eight days of sending this letter.
AI-assisted translation - This translation was produced with AI assistance and has not been peer-reviewed. See the 19th-century translation or original Latin/Greek below for scholarly use.
Latin / Greek Original
XVIII. Scr. in castris XII. Kal. Iunias a.u.c. 711. PLANCUS CICERONI.
Quid in animo habuerim, cum Laevus Nervaque discesserunt a me, et ex litteris, quas eis dedi, et ex ipsis cognoscere potuisti, qui omnibus rebus consiliisque meis interfuerunt. Accidit mihi, quod homini prudenti et cupido satisfaciendi rei publicae bonisque omnibus accidere solet, ut consilium sequerer periculosum magis, dum me probarem, quam tutum, quod habere posset obtrectationem. Itaque post discessum legatorum, cum binis continuis litteris et Lepidus me, ut venirem, rogaret, et Laterensis multo etiam magis prope implorans obtestaretur non ullam rem aliam extimescens quam eandem, quae mihi quoque facit timorem, varietatem atque infidelitatem exercitus eius, non dubitandum putavi, quin succurrerem meque communi periculo offerrem; sciebam enim, etsi cautius illud erat consilium, exspectare me ad Isaram, dum Brutus traiiceret exercitum, et cum collega consentiente, sicut milites faciunt, hostibus obviam ire, tamen, si quid Lepidus bene sentiens detrimenti cepisset, hoc omne assignatum iri aut pertinaciae meae aut timori videbam, si aut hominem offensum mihi, coniunctum cum re publica non sublevassem aut ipse a certamine belli tam necessarii me removissem. Itaque potius periclitari volui, si possem mea praesentia et Lepidum tueri et exercitum facere meliorem, quam nimis cautus videri; sollicitiorem certe hominem, non suis contractis, neminem puto fuisse; nam, quae res nullam habebat dubitationem, si exercitus Lepidi abesset, ea nunc magnam affert sollicitudinem magnumque habet casum; mihi enim si contigisset, ut prior occurrerem Antonio, non mehercules horam constitisset: tantum ego et mihi confido et sic perculsas illius copias Ventidiique mulionis castra despicio; sed non possum non exhorrescere, si quid intra cutem subest vulneris, quod prius nocere potest, quam sciri curarique possit. Sed certe, nisi uno loco me tenerem, magnum periculum ipse Lepidus, magnum ea pars exercitus adiret, quae bene de re publica sentit; magnam etiam perditi hostes accessionem sibi fecissent, si quas copias a Lepido abstraxissent: quae si adventus meus represserit, agam gratias fortunae constantiaeque meae, quae ad hanc experientiam me excitavit. Itaque a. d. XII. Kalend. Iun. ab Isara castra movi; pontem tamen, quem in Isara feceram, castellis duobus ad capita positis reliqui praesidiaque ibi firma posui, ut venienti Bruto exercituique eius sine mora transitus esset paratus. Ipse, ut spero, diebus octo, quibus has litteras dabam, cum Lepidi copiis me coniungam.