Letter 700.1

On Eloquence, addressed to Antoninus [Marcus Aurelius] Augustus. 1. [...] to distinguish the positions of words, their gradations, weights, ages, and dignities, so that in a speech they may not be arranged out of order, as at a drunken and disordered banquet; and what the method is for doubling words and sometimes tripling them, occasionally setting them down fourfold, often raising them to a fifth place or beyond, so that heaps of words are not piled up to no purpose or at random, but are unified within a fixed and skillful limit. 2. After all these things have been investigated, examined, distinguished, defined, and learned, then, from the whole population, so to speak, of all words, just as in war, when there is need to enroll a legion, we choose not only the volunteers but also hunt out those of military age who are in hiding, so when there is need of reinforcements of words, we shall use not only the volunteers that present themselves of their own accord, but we shall draw out those in hiding and track them down for service. 3. Here too, as I judge, this has been skillfully arranged by us [or: agreed upon by us], the methods by which words are to be sought, so that we may not wait gaping and yawning until a word falls of its own accord onto our tongue, like a Palladium dropping from heaven, but so that we may know the regions and the haunts of words, so that, when there is need of words to be sought, we may advance to track them down along a path rather than off the road. 4. There are therefore certain fixed places marked out by us [...] [two pages cannot be read] [...] But it is said by them that the categories of duties are threefold: the first kind, that of substance, namely that one should be; the second, that of quality [...], namely that one should be such-and-such; the third, that of the object, namely that the wise man should carry out the very object for the sake of which he undertakes the higher duties. And indeed a man surely cannot be wise unless [...] but not in the common and indiscriminate manner, but in one suited [...] to him who strives toward wisdom. These two kinds of duties, of substance and of quality [...] [text broken] [...] not content with themselves, but those [...] the very thing and the business of attaining [...] [...] [a long span of text cannot be read] [...] of learning and practicing wisdom. But this third kind, that of the object, I say is bounded by the matter and the business alone, as though content with itself. By this scheme of duties—if indeed either he was speaking the truth, or I retain in memory things heard long ago—the first efforts for a man striving toward wisdom would be those things which pertain to caring for life and health. Therefore both to take a meal and to bathe and to be anointed and the other functions of that kind are wholly duties of the wise man, although neither in the bath does anyone [perform?] wisdom [...] nor [...] anything greater [...] would he have dined at the table, and after the meal was eaten have vomited and belched up wisdom [...] if you eat [...] [text broken] [...] unless you live. 5. Why then must you be warned on this point, not to suppose that this [...] is situated in the meal and the table? It is not the business of wisdom to eat, but without life—without which there can be no wisdom and no pursuits, if such can exist at all—now [...] [text broken] you see, then, [...] duties and [...] [...] [text broken] [...] wisdom [...] [text broken] [...] are not those who [...] yet the duties that follow are not equally [common], which are accommodated to the quality of each man, [though they] can be common to all: one meal is shared by the helmsman and another by the boxer, of whole sides of meat; one is the time for dining, another the bathing, another the sleep, another the keeping vigil. 6. Consider, then, whether the pursuit of eloquence is contained in this second category of duties. For it belongs to Caesars to urge in the Senate what is advantageous, to address the people in assembly on most matters of business, to correct unjust law, to send letters throughout the world, to take to task the kings of foreign nations, to restrain the faults of allies by edicts, to praise good deeds, to check the seditious, to terrify the fierce. All these things must assuredly be done by words and letters. Will you not then cultivate that which you see will be of great use to you so often and in such great matters? Or do you think it makes no difference with what words you carry out things which can be carried out only by words? You are mistaken if you suppose that an opinion expressed in the words of Thersites would carry equal authority in the Senate with the speech of Menelaus or Ulysses—whose very looks in action, and their bearing and posture and ringing voices and the modulation of their eloquence, Homer [...] [described as] different kinds, not yet [...] [two pages cannot be read]. 7. [...] [that there] were Croesus and Solon, Periander and Polycrates, Alcibiades in fine and Socrates. Who doubts that the wise man is distinguished from the unwise man chiefly by counsel and by the choosing of things and by judgment, and that, if there be an option and a choice between riches and poverty—although both are free of vice and virtue—nevertheless the choosing is not free of praise and blame? For it is the proper duty of the wise man to choose rightly, and not wrongly either to put after or to set before. 8. If you should ask me whether I desire good health, I would indeed deny it, if I were a philosopher: for it is not right for a wise man to desire or seek anything which, as chance may have it, he might desire in vain; nor will he desire anything which he sees to be placed in the hand of Fortune. Yet if of necessity one of two things must be chosen, I would rather choose the swiftness of Achilles than the lameness of Philoctetes. The like, therefore, must be observed in eloquence: do not desire it with too much effort, nor turn away from it with too much effort; then, if a choice must be made, you would far and away prefer eloquence to inarticulateness. 9. I have heard you sometimes saying thus: "But indeed, whenever I have expressed something rather beautifully, I am pleased with myself, and therefore I flee eloquence." Why do you not rather correct and remedy this, that you not be pleased with yourself, instead of repudiating that on account of which you are pleased? For as you now do, you are binding the poultice in the wrong place. What then? If you are pleased with yourself for some dutiful reverence toward a parent, will you spurn filial devotion? You are pleased with yourself when you are eloquent: then flog yourself; why do you flog eloquence? And yet Plato would say this and would address you thus: "O young man, your premature flight from being pleased is dangerous to you: for the last little cloak for a man cultivating wisdom is the desire for glory; that is the last to be cast off." To Plato himself, I say, to Plato himself, glory will be a little cloak even to the very end of his life. 10. This too I remember having heard: that wise men ought to hold most things among the principles and resolutions of the mind from which they nevertheless sometimes abstain in practice, and likewise that they ought sometimes to keep some things in practice which they disapprove in their doctrines, and that the right reasoning of wisdom and the necessary practice of life do not everywhere agree. 11. Suppose that you, Caesar, are able to attain the wisdom of Cleanthes or of Zeno; yet against your will the purple cloak must be put on, not the philosophers' mantle of coarse wool. The purple [...] [one page cannot be read]. 12. [...] lest the immortal gods should allow the Comitium and the Rostra and the tribunals, made famous by the speeches of Cato and the Gracchus and Cicero, to fall silent in this age above all others, and the world—which you received as vocal—to be made mute by you. If anyone should cut out the tongue of a single man, he would be held a monster. Do you think it a middling crime to dry up eloquence for the human race? Do you not number such a man with Tereus or Lycurgus? And this Lycurgus—what evil deed did he commit, when he cut down the vines? Truly it would have profited many peoples and nations had wine been banished from every land! Yet Lycurgus paid the penalty for the vines he cut down. Therefore I judge that a divine penalty is to be feared for eloquence banished. For the vine is set under the guardianship of one god, but eloquence many in heaven cherish: Minerva mistress of speech, Mercury endowed with the office of messages, Apollo author of paeans, Liber patron of dithyrambs, the Fauns instigators of prophets, Calliope teacher of Homer, Homer teacher of Ennius, and Sleep. 13. Then, if the pursuit of philosophy were occupied with things alone, I would wonder less that you despise words so greatly. But that you learn the "horned" and the "heap" and the "liar" syllogisms, words twisted and stretched on the rack, while you neglect the cultivation of speech, its weight and majesty and grace and brilliance—this shows that you would rather talk than speak eloquently, that you would rather mutter and chirp than ring out. You set the words of Diodorus and Alexinus before the words of Plato and Xenophon and Antisthenes—as if someone devoted to the stage should use the gesture of Tasurcus rather than of Roscius; as if in swimming, were it equally permitted, he should prefer to imitate the frog rather than the dolphins; to fly with the stunted little wings of quails rather than with the majesty of eagles! 14. Where is that sharpness of yours? Where the subtlety? Wake up and attend: what does Chrysippus himself desire? He is not content [merely to state], but he amplifies as far as he can, he heightens, he fortifies beforehand, he repeats, he defers, he runs back, he questions, he describes, he divides, he invents characters, he adapts his speech to another: these things are "to amplify, to elaborate, to work up beforehand, to say again, to refer back, to insert, to impersonate." Do you see that almost all the weapons of orators are handled by him? Therefore, if Chrysippus himself shows that these are to be used, what more do I demand, except that you use not the words of the dialecticians but rather those of Plato? It is agreed that one must fight with a sword, but it makes a difference whether you fight with a rusty sword or a shining one. 15. Therefore [...] [text broken] except to have composed verses [...] [text broken] to amplify, but this [...] [text broken] unless cautiously [...] [a long span of text cannot be read] [...] and toward [...] [...] another's [...] [...] [text largely illegible]. 16. [...] not [...] [text broken] you can [...] Aesopus [...] [text broken] Pericles a hearer of Anaxagoras the natural philosopher, not of Alexinus the sycophant [...] [a long span of text cannot be read] [...] summoned together [...] [...] [text broken] to be done [...] [...] by drippings [...] [a long span of text cannot be read] [...] you think those whom [...] to write, although [...] [text broken] he writes with the words of the dialecticians, he will have written a Jove sighing, coughing—nay rather wheezing—not thundering. Prepare rather a speech worthy of the thoughts which you will draw from philosophy, and the more honorably you think, the more august you would speak. 17. Nay, raise yourself up and lift yourself high, and with your strong crown shake off those torturers who bend you down like a fir or a tall alder and drag you down to crooked stunted growths, and test whether you have anywhere departed from your dignity. But [summon] the companion of philosophy [...] [a long span of text cannot be read] [...] which if you held them, you would despise; when you have despised them, you would not know them. Tell me, I beg you: do you grasp anything from these dialecticians of yours? Do you rejoice that you grasp anything? I do not want you to tell me: reckon it up within yourself. I declare this: although I have kept very many friends in this discipline [...]. 18. [...] [a long span of text cannot be read] [...] return [...] with shame, the companion of your studies, the counsels of the openings [...] [text broken] lest [...] [text broken] received [...] [text broken] against [...] [text broken] nor [...] in your own affairs [...] the heart itself is destitute [...] I granted [...] tried [...] to attain into this [...] field is wanting [...] to finish what is mutilated, to join what is gaping with stuffing [...] [text broken] but who [...] my [...] will you not pursue all the resources of orators: the skill of refuting, the faculty of amplifying, the charm of evading, of stirring and delighting, of deterring and inciting, of adorning, of conciliating, of defaming, of relaxing the minds of the hearers or of enticing them, a certain right power and command in speaking? 19. Then, whenever, being distracted by business, you lacked time for composing a continuous oration, did you not prop yourself up with certain hasty and stolen consolations of study—by collecting synonyms, by sometimes searching out single words, so that you might convert the clauses of the ancients, the cola, by the method of synonyms; so that from the common you might render elegance, from the soiled things new ones; so that you might fit some image, throw in a figure, adorn with an ancient word, paint on a touch of antique color? If you despise these things because you have learned them, then by learning philosophy you will despise it too. 20. But these are not the kind of things you can despise; you may indeed not love them—as Crassus the grim long ago hated laughter, as in our own memory this other Crassus shunned the light, as likewise in our memory a man of consular rank dreaded open fields, the Pomptine field [...] [eight pages are missing].

to Antoninus Augustus. 1 . . . . to distinguish between the place, rank, weight, age, and dignity of words, that they may not be put together absurdly in a speech, as it might be in a drunken and confused carouse; on what principles words are to be doubled and sometimes trebled, on occasion drawn up four deep, often carried to a fifth place or even extended further than that; that words be not heaped to no purpose or at random but be combined within fixed and intelligent limits. 2. When all these have been examined, tested, distinguished, defined, and understood, then from the whole word-population, so to speak, just as in war, when a legion has to be enrolled, we not only collect the volunteers but also search out the skulkers of military age, so when there is need of word-reinforcements, we must not only make use of the voluntary recruits that offer themselves, but fetch out the skulkers and hunt them up for service. 3. At this point too, as I think, we must seek skilfully to find out the methods by which words are sought for, that we may not wait gaping open-mouthed till such time as a word shall fall of itself upon our tongues like a god-send from heaven; but that we should know their haunts and their coverts, so that, when we have need of choice words, we may follow them up along a beaten track rather than have no path to help us forward. 4. You must therefore scout over definite ground . . . . . . . . First of all a speaker must be on his guard against coining a new word like debased bronze, so that each several word may be both known by its age and delight by its freshness . . . . fortresses of words . . . . assembly-places of words . . . . . . . . Of obligations the kinds are two, the categories three-fold. The first class, of existence, that a man be; the second, of quality, that he be such and such; the third, of objective, that he satisfy the very object by reason of which he undertook the foregoing obligations . . . . of learning and practising wisdom: by this third class, however, I mean that of objective and that which has its end in the work to be done and is, as it were, content with itself. By this division of obligations, if indeed either he said what was true, or I carry correctly in my memory things heard long ago, for a man who aspires to wisdom those would count as the first things to be taken in hand which have to do with the preservation of life and health. So dining and bathing and anointing with oil and all functions of such a kind are obligations of the wise man. And yet neither at the baths can anyone lave himself with wisdom, nor when he has dined at table with a select company, and after the meal had occasion to vomit, will he bring up wisdom; but you can neither have life unless you eat, nor wisdom unless you live. What then is the warning here? that you should not think this business of wisdom to lie in dining and the pleasures of the table. The business of wisdom is not to eat, but apart from life, which is derived from food, there can be no wisdom and no pursuits. Now . . . . you see then that these primary obligations apply to all men . . . . . . . . but the second class of obligations which are suited to the character of each person, cannot be in the same way common to all. One kind of dinner is usual for the man at the wheel, and another off the whole chine of an ox for the prize-fighter; their times of dining are different, their washing is different, their sleeping, their keeping awake different. 5. Consider then whether in this second category of obligations be contained the pursuit of eloquence. For it falls to a Caesar to carry by persuasion necessary measures in the Senate, to address the people in a harangue on many important matters, to correct the inequities of the law, to despatch rescripts throughout the world, to take foreign kings to task, to repress by edicts disorders among the allies, to praise their services, to crush the rebellious and to cow the proud. All these must assuredly be done by speech and writing. Will you not then cultivate an art, which you see must be of great use to you so often and in matters of such moment? Or do you imagine that it makes no difference with what words you bring about what can only be brought about by words? You are mistaken if you think that an opinion blurted out in the Senate in the language of Thersites would carry equal weight with a speech of Menelaus or Ulysses, whose looks, in the act of speaking and their mien and attitude and melodious voices and the difference of cadence in their oratory Homer did not in fact disdain to describe . . . . . . . . 6. Can anyone fear him whom he laughs at, or could anyone obey his order, whose words he despised? When Alexander the Great was discussing the art of painting in the studio of Apelles, Hold your tongue , said the painter, about what you don't understand, that those boys yonder who are mixing the purple paint may not despise you . . . . There is no one, however authoritative, who when his skill is at fault is not looked down upon by him who has greater skill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. You have achieved such great eloquence as is even more than enough for fame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and hair, though it need not be daily set off with a pin, yet must daily be smoothed out with a comb . . . . Croesus and Solon, Periander and Polycrates, Alcibiades in fine and Socrates. 8. Who doubts that a wise man is distinguished from an unwise man preeminently by his sagacity and choice of things and judgment, so that if there be an option and alternative between riches and poverty, though they are both of them devoid of vice and virtue, yet the choice between them is not devoid of praise or blame. For it is the special obligation of the wise man to choose rightly, and not wrongly put this first or that second. 9. If you ask me whether I covet good health, I should, if I were a philosopher, say no; for a wise man must not covet or desire anything which it may be he would covet in vain; nor will he covet anything which he sees to lie in the power of Fortune. Yet were the choice of one or the other forced upon me, I would rather choose the fleetness of Achilles than the lameness of Philoctetes. A similar course must be kept in eloquence. You should, therefore, not covet it too much or too much disdain it: yet if a choice must be made you would far and far prefer eloquence to dumbness. 10. I have heard you say sometimes, But indeed, when I have said something rather brilliant, I feel gratified, and that is why I shun eloquence . Why not rather correct and cure yourself of your self-gratification, instead of repudiating that which gratifies you. For acting as you now do, you are tying a poultice in the wrong place. What then? If you gratify yourself by giving just judgment, will you disown justice? If you gratify yourself by shewing some filial respect to your father, will you despise filial duty? You gratify yourself, when eloquent: chastize yourself then, but why chastize eloquence? 11. And yet Plato would tell you this and take you thus to task: Perilous, young man, is that hasty avoidance of self-gratification, for the last cloak that wraps the follower after wisdom is the love of fame, that is the last to be discarded: to Plato, to Plato himself, I say, will fame be a cloak to his very last day. This also I remember to have heard, that wise men must needs have many things—I mean in their mental rules and postulates—to which in practice they occasionally give the go-by; and occasionally also must needs allow in practice some things which they cry out upon in their tenets; and that the right rules of wisdom and the necessary practices of life do not everywhere coincide. 12. Suppose that you, O Caesar, succeed in attaining to the wisdom of Cleanthes or Zeno, yet against your will you must put on the purple cloak, not the philosopher's mantle of coarse wool. Purple . . . . . . . . Cleanthes gained his livelihood by drawing water from a well; you have often to see that saffron-water is sprinkled broadcast and high in the theatre . . . . . . . . . . Diogenes the Cynic not only earned no money but took no care of what he had . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13. What, will the Immortal Gods allow the Comitium and Rostra and tribunals, that echoed to the speeches of Cato and Gracchus and Cicero, to be hushed in this age of all others? the wide world, which was vocal when you received it, to become dumb by your doing? If one cut out the tongue of a single man, he would be deemed a monster; to cut eloquence out from the human race—do you think that a trivial crime? Do you rank the doer of this with Tereus and Lycurgus? and this Lycurgus, what evil deed pray did he commit when he lopped the vines? It had surely been to the benefit of many a race and nation had the vine been extirpated from the face of the earth. Yet Lycurgus paid dear for his felled vines. Wherefore I hold that the extirpation of eloquence must fear vengeance from Heaven. For the vine is placed under the patronage of one God, while eloquence is the delight of many a denizen of Heaven—Minerva the mistress of speech, Mercury the controller of messages, Apollo the author of paeans, Liber the defender of dithyrambs, the Fauns inspirers of prophecies, Calliope the instructress of Homer, Homer the instructor of Ennius, and Sleep. 14. Again, if the study of philosophy were concerned with practice alone, I should wonder less at your despising words so much. That you should, however, learn horn-dilemmas , heap-fallacies , liar-syllogisms , verbal quibbles and entanglements, while neglecting the cultivation of oratory, its dignity and majesty and charm and splendour—this shews that you prefer mere speaking to real speaking, a whisper and a mumble to a trumpet-note. Do you rank the words of Diodorus and Alexinus higher than the words of Plato and Xenophon and Antisthenes? as though anyone with a passion for the stage should copy the acting of Tasurcus rather than Roscius; as though in swimming, were both possible, one would choose to take pattern by a frog rather than by a dolphin, and flit rather on the puny wings of quails than soar with the majesty of an eagle. 15. Where is that shrewdness of yours? where your discernment? Wake up and hear what Chrysippus himself prefers. Is he content to teach, to disclose the subject, to define, to explain? He is not content: but he amplifies as much as he can, he exaggerates, he forestalls objections, he repeats, he postpones, he harks back, he asks questions, describes, divides, introduces fictitious characters, puts his own words in another's mouth: those are the meanings of αὔξειν, διασκενάζειν, ἐξεργάζεσθαι, πάλιν, λέγειν, ἐπαναφέρειν, παράπτειν, προσωποποιεῖν . 16. Do you see that he handles almost all the weapons of the orator? Therefore if Chrysippus himself has shewn that these should be used, what more do I ask, unless it be that you should not employ the verbiage of the dialecticians but rather the eloquence of Plato? . . . . A sword must be used in fight against (opponents), but it matters much whether the blade be rusty or burnished . . . . Epictetus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . if he had dared, an epitaph . . . . . . . . . . . . carried through with the greatest credit . . . . . . . . . . . . If anywhere . . . . a disciple of Anaxagoras not of the sycophant Alexinus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17. The tragedian Aesopus is said never to have put on a tragic mask without setting it in front of him and studying it a long time that he might conform his gestures and adapt his voice to the face of the mask . . . . . . . . . . . . or do you think it a greater task to write the tragedy Amphiaraus than to speak on the subject of an earthquake? . . . . you argue about a thunderbolt . . . . 18. Philosophy will tell you what to say, Eloquence how to say it . . . . For, using the language of dialecticians, a writer would speak of a Jove signing, nay rather wheezing, not thundering. Provide yourself rather with speech worthy of the thoughts you draw from philosophy, and the more noble your thoughts, the more impressive will your utterance be. Nay, lift yourself up and stand upright, and shake off with your strong top those tree-twisters who are bending you down, like a fir or stately alder, and lowering you to the level of stunted bushes, and make trial whether you have anywhere swerved from the right way. But summon Eloquence, the handmaid of philosophy, and cast away those crooked, twisted modes of speech . . . . which if you took them in, you would despise, and ignore when you have despised them. Tell me, I pray you, do you take anything in from your dialectics? are you proud of taking in anything? You need not confess to me, but think it over with yourself. I prophesy this, though you have kept many of your friends loyal to this teaching . . . .

ad Anton. de eloqu. 2 [135 Hout; 2.52 Haines] <Antonino Augusto Fronto.> 1 <...> verborum loca, gradus pondera aetates dignitatesque dinoscere, ne in oratione praepostere, ut in temulento ac perturbato convivio, conlocentur; quae ratio sit verba geminandi et interdum trigeminandi, nonnumquam quadriplicia, saepe quinquies aut eo amplius superlata ponendi, ne frustra neve temere verborum strues acerventur, sed ut certo ac sollertei termino uniantur. 2 Post ista omnia investigata, examinata, distincta, finita, cognita verborum omnium, ut ita dixerim, populo, sicut in bello, ubi opus est legionem conscribere, non tantum voluntarios legimus, sed etiam latentis militari aetate conquirimus, ita ubi verborum praesidiis opus sit, non voluntariis tantum, quae ultro obvenerint, utemur, sed latentia eliciemus atque ad imperandum indigabimus. 3 Hic illud etiam, ut ego arbitror, scite a nobis conventum, quibus rationibus verba quaerantur, ut non hiantes oscitantesque exspectemus, quando verbum ultro in linguam quasi Palladium de caelo depluat, sed ut regiones verborum et saltus noverimus ut, ubi quaesitis opus sit, ut per viam potius ad vestigandum quam invio progrediamur. 4 Certa igitur loca sunt a nobis <...> [duae paginae legi nequeunt] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . dicitur autem esse officiorum rationis tripertitas ab eis: Primam speciem substantiae, ut sit, alteram qualitatis . . . tis, ut talis sit, tertiam rei, ut rem ipsam, cujus causa sapiens superiora officia suscipit, exerceat. Etiam profecto vir sapiens esse non potest, nisi . . autem non vulgari ritu et promisco, sed qui aptus con . . . . . . tendenti ad sapientiam. Has duas officiorum species substantiae et qualitatis . . . . . . . eri . ed non ter annua t . . . . neque semet contentas, sed illi - - g . . . . ipsam et negotium capiscendae exi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . discendae exercendaeque sapientiae. Tertiam autem hanc speciem rei dico ac negotiis solam terminatam, se quasi contentam. Hac officiorum ratione, si tamen aut ille verum ajebat aut ego olim audita memoria retineo, ut prima homini ad sapientiam tendenti sint molimenta, quae ad vitam salutemque pertinent adcurandam. Igitur et prandere et lavari et ungui et cetera ejusmodi munera tota sunt sapientis officia, quamquam neque in balneo quisquam sapientia s . p . ni . . usl . neque ut circa et au . . . d . id majus vi . . . . . . es . ad mensam cenarit, prandio comeso vomerit, sapientiam ructarit . . . . . ur, si ederis . . . . . . . . ces, i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nisi vixeris. 5 Quid igitur istic admonendus es ne tinc . . . c . . . . nvio hoc d . . . . is . ene . . . prandio et mensa situm existimes? Non est sapientiae negotium vesci, sed sine vita, qua sine nulla sapientia, studia nulla si possunt esse, jam nunc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vides igitur . . . . . . . . officia et . . . . . . . tum a . ua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sapientia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . non sunt qui . . . . at non aeque sequentia officia, quae sunt qualitati cujusque accomodata, possunt omnium esse communia: Aliud prandium gubernatori commune et aliud pugili de integris tegoribus; aliud prandendi tempus aliua lavatio, alius somnus, alia pervigilatio. 6 Considera igitur, an in hac secunda ratione officiorum contineatur eloquentiae studium. Nam Caesarum est in senatu quae e re sunt suadere, populum de plerisque negotiis in contione appellare, jus injustum corrigere, per orbem litteras missitare, reges exterarum gentium compellare, sociorum culpas edictis coervcere, bene facta laudare, seditiosos compescere, feroces territare. Omnia ista profecto verbis sunt ac litteris agenda. Non excoles igitur id, quod tibi totiens tantisque in rebus videas magno usui futurum? An nihil referre arbitraris qualibus verbis agas, quae non nisi verbis agi possunt? Erras, si putas pari auctoritate in senatu fore Thersitae verbis expromptam sententiam et Menelai aut Ulixi orationem, quorum Homerus et voltus in agendo et habitus et status et voces canoras ac modulationem eloquentiae genera diversa nondum <...> [duae paginae legi nequeunt] 7 <…> fuisse Croesum et Solonem, periandrum et Polycraten, Alcibiaden denique et Socraten. Quis dubitat sapientem ab insipsiente vel praecipue consilio et dilectu rerum et opinione discerni et, si sit optio atque electio divitiarum atque egestatus, quamquam utraque et malitia et virtute careant, tamen electionem laude et culpa non carere? Proprium namque sapientis officium est recte eligere neque perperam vel postponere vel anteferre. 8 Si me interroges concupiscamne bonam valetudinem, abnuam equidem, si sim philosophus: Nihil est enim fas concupiscere sapienti aut adpetere, quod fors fuat, an frustra concupiscat; nec quicquam, quod in manu Fortunae situm videat, concupiscet. Tamen si necessario sit altera res eligenda, Achillei potius pernicitatem eligam quam debilitaten Philoctetae. Simile igitur in eloquentia servandum: Non opere nimio concupiscas igitur nec opere nimio aversere; tum si eligendum sit, longe longeque eloquentiam infantiae praeferas. 9 Audivi te nonnumquam ita dicentem: “Atenim cum aliquid pulchrius elocutus sum placeo mihi ideoque eloquentiam fugio.” Quin tu potius illud corrigis ac mederis ne places tibi, non ut id propter quod places repudies? Nam ut nunc facis, alibi tu medicamenta obligas. Quid tandem? Si tibi placebis tibi pio aliquo cultu parentis, pietatem spernabere? Places tibi cum facundus? Igitur verbera te; quid facundiam verberas? Tametsi Plato ita diceret itaque te compellaret: “O juvenis, periculosa est tibi praepropera placendi fuga: Novissimum namque homini sapientiam colenti amiculum est gloriae cupido; id novissimum exuitur.” Ipsi, ipsi, inquam, Platoni in novissimum usque vitae finem gloria amiculum erit. 10 Illud etiam audisse me memini pleraque sapientes viros in placitis mentis atque consultis habere debere quorum intedum usu abstineant, itemque interdum nonnulla in usu habere debere quae dogmatis improbent neque ubique rationem sapientiae rectam et usum vitae necessarium congruere. 11 Fac te, Caesar, ad sapientiam Cleanthis aut Zenonis posse pertingere, ingratiis tamen sibi purpureum pallium erit sumendum, non pallium philosophorum soloci lana. Purpureo <...> [una pagina legi nequit] 12 <...> ne di immortales seirint comitium et rostra et tribunalia Catonis et Gracchi et Ciceronis orationibus celebrata hoc potissimum saeculo conticiscere, orbem terrae, quem vocalem acceperis, mutum a te fieri. Si linguam quis uni homini exsecet, inmanis habeatur. Eloquentiam humano generi exsicari mediocre facinus putas? Non hunc adnumeras Tereo aut Lycurgo? Qui Lycurgus quid tandem mali facinoris admisit, quam vites amputavit? Multis profecto gentibus ac nationibus profuisset vinum undique gentium exterminatum! Tamen Lycurgus poenas caesarum vitium luit. Quare metuendam censeo divinitus poenam eloquentiae exterminatae. Nam vinea in unius tutela dei sita, eloquentiam vero multi in caelo diligunt: Minerva orationis magistra, Mercurius nuntiis praeditus, Apollo paeanum auctor, Liber dithyramborum cognitor, Fauni vaticinantium incitatores, magistra Homeri Calliopa, magister Enni Homerus et Somnus. 13 Tum si studium philosophiae in rebus esset solis occupatum, minus mirarer, quod tanto opere verba contemneres. Discere te autem ceratinas et soritas et pseudomenus, verba contorta et fidicularia, neglegere vero cultum orationis et gravitatem et majestatem et gratiam et nitorem, hoc indicat loqui te quam eloqui malle, murmurare potius et friguttire quam clangere. Diodori tu et Alexini verba verbis Platonis et Xenophontis et Antisthenis anteponis, ut si quis histrionae studiosus Tasurci gestu potius quam Roscii uteretur, ut si in natando, si aeque liceret, ranam potius quam delphinos aemulari mallet, coturnicum potius pinnis breviculis quam aquilarum majestate volitare! 14 Ubi illud acumen tuum? Ubi subtilitas? Evigila et atende, quid cupiat ipse Chrysippus? Non est contentus, verum auget, in quantum potest, exaggerat, praemunit, iterat, differt, recurrit, interrogat, describit, dividit, personas fingit, orationem suam alii accommodat: ταῦτα δ᾿ ἐστὶν αὔξειν, διασκευάζειν, προϋπεργάζεσθαι, πάλιν λέγειν, ἐπαναφέρειν, παράπτειν, προσωποποιεῖν. Videsne ab eo paene omnia oratorum arma tractari? Igitur, si ipse Chrysippus his utendum esse ostendit, quid ego amplius postulo nisi, ut ne verbis dialecticorum, sed potius Platonis utaris: Gladio dimicandum esse convenit, verum utrum dimices gladio robiginoso an splendido interest. 15 Quare est den . ce ais . . agrais . . . . s . . excepto versus composuisse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . augere, sed id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ni caute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . no . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c . . . omne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ins . . . . . . . . . . . . ini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . am . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . u . . . es . . . . . . . et ad ni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . alienas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ra eam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 kisi non quam . . . . . . . . nionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . potes s . . . . . . . . . . . Aesopus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pericles Anaxagorae physici, non Alexini sycophantae auditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . convocatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . stillicidiis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . putas quos o . . . . scribere, quamquam . . . . . . . . ans sa . . . . con . . . . sco dialecticorum verbis scribat, suspirantem, tussientem immo Jovem scripserit, non tonantem. Para potius orationem dignam sensibus, quos e philosophia hauries, et quanto honestius sentis tanto augustius dicas. 17 Quin erige te et extolle et tortores istos, qui te ut abietem et alnum proceram incurvant et ad chamaetorta detrahunt, valido cacumine tuo excute et tempta an usquam ab dignitate discesseris. Sed comitem philosophiae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . has si tenueris, contemnas; quom contempseris, nescias. Dic, obsecro, mihi: De dialecticis istis ecquid tenes? Ecquid tenere te gaudes? Nolo mihi dicas: Apud te ipse reputa. Ego illud praedico, quom plurimos amicos in hac disciplina tenuerim <...> 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rediro . . pudore studiorum tuorum comite exordiorum consilia paxosci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ne quen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . acci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . accolta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . contra sosu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . neque . . . . . . . . . . in tui ages . . . . . . . . . . . . inops est ipsum pectus . . . . . . . . concessi n . . . . . . . . experta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . adipisci in hanc te . . . . agel deest lu . . . . . . . mutilum perficere, hiulcum fartis jugare . . . . . . e . . gentat . . . . . . . set qui meum in . . . . . . . . . . . nonne omnis oratorum copias sectabere: refutandi sollertiam, augendi facultatetm, eludendi venustatem, permovendi delectandique, deterrendi incitandique, ornandi, conciliandi, infamandi, laxandi audientium animos aut alliciendi, rectam quandam in dicendo potentiam ac potestatem? 19 Tum si quando tibi negotiis disticto perpetuae orationis conscribundae tempus deesset, nonne te tumultuaris quibusdam et lucrativis studiorum solaciis fulciebas, synonymis colligendis, verbis interdum singularibus requirendis, ut veterum commata, ut cola synonymorum ratione converteres, ut de volgaribus elegantia, de contaminateis nova redderes, imaginem aliquam accommodares, figuram iniceres, prisco verbo adornares, colorem vetusculum adpingeres? Haec si propterea contemnis, quia didicisti, philosophiam quoque discendo contemnes. 20 Sed non ea sunt ista, quae possis contemnere; possis sane non amare, ut olim Crassus tristis risum oderat, ut nostra hic memoria Crassus lucem fugitabat, ut nostra itidem memoria vir consularis campos formidabat, Pomptinum campum <...> [octo paginae desunt]