Letter 150

Shaken by events of the greatest and most miserable kind, and unable to deliberate with you face to face, I still wanted to use your advice. The whole question is this: if Pompey leaves Italy, as I suspect he will, what do you think I should do? So that you can advise me more easily, I will briefly lay out what comes to my mind on both sides. On one side, Pompey's immense services to my safety, my close friendship with him, and the cause of the republic itself all lead me to think I should join either my plan to his plan or my fortune to his fortune. Add this: if I stay and abandon that company of the best and most distinguished citizens, I must fall under the power of one man. Although he gives many signs of being friendly to me - and you know that, long before this storm threatened, I took care that he should be - still two things must be considered. How much trust should be placed in him? And if it were fully proven that he will be my friend, is it the part of a brave man and good citizen to remain in a city where he has held the highest honors and commands, done the greatest deeds, and held the highest priesthood, only to cease being what he was and perhaps face some disgrace if Pompey ever recovers the republic? Those are the arguments on that side. Now look at the other. Our Pompey has done nothing wisely, nothing bravely, and I add this too: nothing except against my advice and authority. I pass over the old points: that he nourished Caesar in the republic, increased his power, armed him, supported laws carried by violence and against the auspices, added Further Gaul to his command, became his father-in-law, acted as augur in the adoption of Publius Clodius, was more eager for my restoration than for my protection, prolonged Caesar's province, supported him in everything while absent, and even in his third consulship, after he began to be defender of the republic, worked for all ten tribunes to carry a proposal allowing Caesar's candidacy in absence, a privilege he himself confirmed in one of his laws, and then opposed the consul Marcus Marcellus when Marcellus set March 1 as the end of Caesar's Gallic provinces. But let those things go. What could be more foul or more confused than this departure from the city - or rather this most shameful flight? What condition should not have been accepted rather than abandon the fatherland? The terms were bad, I admit. But were they worse than this? "He will recover the republic," you say. When? What is prepared for that hope? Has Picenum not been lost? Has the road to the city not been opened? Has all money, public and private, not been handed over to the enemy? In short, there is no cause, no force, no fixed place where those who want the republic defended can gather. Apulia has been chosen: the emptiest part of Italy and the farthest removed from the impact of this war. In despair, he has plainly sought flight and access to the sea. I took Capua unwillingly - not because I was avoiding that duty, but because, in a cause where there was no open grief among the orders or private citizens, and among the good men only the usual dull sort of concern, and where, as I myself observed, the crowd and every lowest element leaned to the other side and many desired revolution, I told him himself that I would undertake nothing without a garrison and without money. So I had no business at all, because from the beginning I saw that nothing was being sought except flight. If I follow that flight now, where do I go? Not with him. When I had set out to join him, I learned that Caesar was positioned in such places that I could not come safely to Luceria. We must sail on the lower sea, in the depth of winter, with no certain course. And then what: with my brother, or without him, with my son? How? Either way there will be extreme difficulty and extreme pain. And what attack will Caesar make on me and on my property while I am absent? Sharper than on others, because perhaps he will think there is some popularity to gain by violating me. Consider too these chains - I mean these laurelled fasces. How troublesome it is to carry them out of Italy. Even if the waves are calm, what place will be safe for us before we reach Pompey? By what route or to what destination, we do not know. If I stay and there is a place for me on this side, I will have done what Lucius Philippus did under Cinna's domination, what Lucius Flaccus did, what Quintus Mucius did, however that matter ended for him. He used to say that he had seen what would happen, and yet preferred it to coming armed to the walls of his fatherland. Thrasybulus took another course, perhaps a better one. But there is a definite principle in Mucius' view, and in Philippus' too: that when necessary one must submit to the times, and not miss one's moment when it is given. Yet even here these fasces bring the same difficulty. Suppose Caesar is friendly to me - uncertain, but suppose it. He will offer the triumph. To refuse it may be dangerous; to accept it will anger the good men. "What a hard and inexplicable thing," you say. Yet it must be explained. What else can be done? Do not think I lean more toward staying because I have used more words on that side. It often happens in a question that one side takes more words and the other has more truth. So please advise me as a man deliberating calmly about the greatest possible matter. I have a ship ready at Caieta and at Brundisium. But look: as I write these very words at night in Cales, messengers arrive, and letters too. Caesar is at Corfinium; Domitius is at Corfinium with a strong army eager to fight. I do not think our Gnaeus will go so far as to abandon Domitius, although he had sent Scipio ahead to Brundisium with two cohorts, and had written to the consuls that he wanted one consul to take to Sicily the legion enrolled for Faustus. It will be shameful to desert Domitius when he begs for help. There is a certain hope - small in my judgment, but firm in these parts - that Afranius has fought Trebonius in the Pyrenees, that Trebonius was beaten back, that your Fabius too has crossed over with his cohorts, and, above all, that Afranius is arriving with large forces. If this is true, perhaps we will remain in Italy. Since Caesar's route was uncertain, and he was thought likely to go either to Capua or to Luceria, I sent Lepta to Pompey with a letter; I myself turned back to Formiae so that I would not fall in with anyone. I wanted you to know this, and I have written with a calmer mind than in my last letter, putting forward no judgment of my own, but asking for yours.

Upset by this grave and most calamitous crisis, though I have no opportunity of consulting you personally, still I wish to enjoy your advice. The whole question under debate is this. What do you think I should do, if Pompey leaves Italy, as I expect he will? To help you to a decision, I will briefly recount what occurs to me on both sides of the question. Not only Pompey's great services in bringing about my restoration and his intimacy with me, but the public welfare, leads me to think that my policy and his or, if you will, my fortunes and his should be one. And another thing, if I remain in Italy and desert the company of loyal and distinguished citizens, I must fall into the power of one man, and, though he gives me many tokens of regard (and you know well I took good care that it should be so with this crisis in view), yet he still leaves me a twofold problem; how much trust can be put in his promises, and, if I am positive of his good will, is it proper for a man of courage and loyalty to remain in Rome and lose his position for the future where he has enjoyed the highest distinctions and commands, performed deeds of importance, been invested with the highest seat in the sacred college, and to suffer risks and perhaps some shame, if ever Pompey restore the constitution? So much for the arguments on one side. Now look at those on the other. There is not an atom of prudence or courage in Pompey's policy—and besides nothing that is not clean contrary to my counsel and advice. I pass over the old grievance, how Caesar was Pompey's man: Pompey raised him to place and military power, assisted him in passing laws by force and despite bad omens, granted him Further Gaul in addition to his province; Pompey married his daughter, Pompey was augur at the adoption of Clodius; Pompey was more active in effecting my restoration than in preventing my banishment; Pompey prolonged the tenure of Caesar's provincial government; Pompey championed his cause in absence; and again in his third consulship, when he began to be the defender of the constitution, struggled to get the ten tribunes to propose a bill admitting Caesar's candidature in absence; ratified that privilege by a law of his own; and opposed M. Marcellus the consul, when Marcellus would have concluded Caesar's government of the provinces of Gaul on the 1st of March. Putting all this on one side, is not this departure or rather this disgraceful and iniquitous flight from Rome a most shameful sign of panic? Any compromise ought to have been accepted in preference to abandoning our country. I admit the terms were bad, but could anything be worse than this? If you say he will restore the constitution, I ask you when and what preparation has been made to that end? We have lost Picenum: the road lies open to Rome: the funds of the state and of individuals have been delivered to our enemy. Finally we have no policy, no forces, no rendezvous for patriots; Apulia has been chosen, the least populous district in Italy and the most removed from the brunt of this war, and clearly chosen in despair for the opportunity of flight which the sea affords. With reluctance I took charge of Capua, not that I would shirk the duty, but with the reluctance which one would have in a cause in which neither ranks nor individuals had expressed any feeling, though there was some feeling amongst the loyalists, sluggish as usual. Besides, as I felt, the crowd and the dregs of the populace were inclined to the other side, and many were merely desirous of revolution. I told Pompey himself that I could undertake nothing without a garrison and without funds. So I have had nothing at all to do, since I saw from the first, that his only object was flight. If I would share his flight, whither am I to go? With him I cannot go; for, when I set out, I learned that Caesar was so posted that I could not reach Luceria with safety. I should have to go by the Lower Sea in the depth of winter and with no certain destination. Moreover am I to take my brother, or leave him and take my son? But how? Either course would cause me the greatest trouble and the greatest grief: and how he will wreak his rage on me and my property in my absence! More vindictively perhaps than in the case of others, because he will think that vengeance on me will please the people. Consider too my fetters, I mean my laurelled fasces. How awkward it will be to take them out of Italy! Suppose I enjoy a calm passage, what place will be safe for me till I join Pompey? I have no idea of how or where to go. But, if I stand my ground and find a place on Caesar's side, I shall follow the example of L. Philippus under the tyranny of Cinna, of L. Flaccus and of Q. Mucius. Though it ended unfortunately in the case of Q. Mucius, yet he was wont to say he foresaw the issue, but preferred it to taking arms against his country. Thrasybulus took the other and perhaps happier course. But Mucius' decision and views were quite definite, and so were those of Philippus; that one might do some time-serving, when it was necessary, but when one's time came, one should not miss it. But, in that event, still my fasces are a nuisance. I do not know if Caesar will be friendly; but suppose he is, he will offer me a triumph. To refuse would damage my chances with Caesar, to accept would annoy the loyalists. It is a hard and insoluble question; and yet solve it I must. What else can I do? I have said most in favour of staying in Italy: but do not infer that I have any particular inclination towards so doing: it may be, as often happens, that there are more words on one side and more worth on the other. Then please give me your advice, counting me openminded on the important question. There is a boat ready for me at Caieta and at Brundisium. But, here are messengers arriving as I write this letter at night in Cales; and here is a letter saying that Caesar has reached Corfinium and that Domitius is there with a strong force anxious to fight. I do not think that Pompey will go so far as to abandon Domitius, though he sent Scipio ahead to Brundisium with two squadrons, and has informed the consuls that he wants one of them to take the legion raised for Faustus into Sicily. But it were base to desert Domitius, when he entreats for help. There is some hope, small enough to my mind, but favoured in this district, that Afranius has fought with Trebonius in the Pyrenees and driven him back, and that your friend Fabius too has gone over to Pompey with his squadrons: and high hope, that Afranius is marching hither with large forces. If that is true, we may stay in Italy. But since no one knows Caesar's route, as he was supposed to be going towards Capua or Luceria, I am sending Lepta to Pompey with a letter. Myself I return to Formiae for fear I should stumble on anyone. I wanted you to know the news, and I write with more composure than I stated above. I advance no views of my own, but ask for yours.

maximis et miserrimis rebus perturbatus, cum coram tecum mihi potestas deliberandi non esset, uti tamen tuo consilio volui. deliberatio autem omnis haec est, si Pompeius Italia excedat, quod eum facturum esse suspicor, quid mihi agendum putes. et quo facilius consilium dare possis, quid in utramque partem mihi in mentem veniat explicabo brevi. [2] Cum merita Pompei summa erga salutem meam familiaritasque quae mihi cum eo est, tum ipsa rei publicae causa me adducit ut mihi vel consilium meum cum illius consilio vel fortuna (mea cum illius fortuna) coniungenda esse videatur. accedit illud. si maneo et illum comitatum optimorum et clarissimorum civium desero, cadendum est in unius potestatem. qui etsi multis rebus significat se nobis esse amicum (et ut esset a me est, tute scis, propter suspicionem huius impendentis tempestatis multo ante provisum), tamen utrumque considerandum est et quanta fides ei sit habenda et, si maxime exploratum sit eum nobis amicum fore, sitne viri fortis et boni civis esse in ea urbe in qua cum summis honoribus imperiisque usus sit, res maximas gesserit, sacerdotio sit amplissimo praeditus, non futurus (sit, qui fuerit), subeundumque periculum sit cum aliquo fore dedecore, si quando Pompeius rem publicam reciperarit. [3] in hac parte haec sunt. vide nunc quae sint in altera. nihil actum est a Pompeio nostro sapienter, nihil fortiter, addo etiam nihil nisi contra consilium auctoritatemque meam. omitto illa vetera, quod istum in rem publicam ille aluit, auxit, armavit, ille legibus per vim et contra auspicia ferendis auctor, ille Galliae ulterioris adiunctor, ille gener, ille in adoptando P. Clodio augur, ille restituendi mei quam retinendi studiosior, ille provinciae propagator, ille absentis in omnibus adiutor, idem etiam tertio consulatu, postquam esse defensor rei publicae coepit, contendit ut decem tribuni pl. ferrent ut absentis ratio haberetur, quod idem ipse sanxit lege quadam sua, Marcoque Marcello consuli finienti provincias Gallias Kalendarum Martiarum die restitit—sed ut haec omittam, quid foedius, quid perturbatius hoc ab urbe discessu sive potius turpissima fuga? quae condicio non accipienda fuit potius quam relinquenda patria? [4] malae condiciones erant, fateor, sed num quid hoc peius? at reciperabit rem publicam. quando? aut quid ad eam spem est parati? non ager Picenus amissus? non patefactum iter ad urbem? non pecunia omnis et publica et privata adversario tradita? denique nulla causa, nullae vires, nulla sedes quo concurrant qui rem publicam defensam velint. Apulia delecta est, inanissima pars Italiae et ab impetu huius belli remotissima; fuga et maritima opportunitas visa quaeri desperatione. invite cepi Capuam, non quo munus illud defugerem, sed in ea causa in qua nullus esset ordinum, nullus apertus privatorum dolor, bonorum autem esset aliquis sed hebes, ut solet, et, ut ipse sensi, esset multitudo et infimus quisque propensus in alteram partem, multi mutationis rerum cupidi, dixi ipsi me nihil suscepturum sine praesidio et sine pecunia. itaque habui nihil omnino negoti, quod ab initio vidi nihil quaeri praeter fugam. eam si nunc sequor, quonam? Cum illo non; ad quem cum essem profectus, cognovi in iis locis esse Caesarem, ut tuto Luceriam venire non possem. infero mari nobis incerto cursu hieme maxima navigandum est. age iam, cum fratre an sine eo cum filio? at quo modo? in utraque enim re summa difficultas erit summus animi dolor; qui autem impetus illius erit in nos absentis fortunasque nostras! acrior quam in ceterorum, quod putabit fortasse in nobis violandis aliquid se habere populare. age iam, has compedes, fascis, inquam, hos laureatos ecferre ex Italia quam molestum est! qui autem locus erit nobis tutus, ut iam placatis utamur fluctibus, ante quam ad illum venerimus? qua autem aut quo nihil scimus. [6] at si restitero et fuerit nobis in hac parte locus, idem fecero quod in Cinnae dominatione (L.) Philippus, quod L. Flaccus, quod Q. Mucius, quoquo modo ea res huic quidem cecidit; qui tamen ita dicere solebat se id fore videre quod factum est sed malle quam armatum ad patriae moenia accedere. aliter Thrasybulus et fortasse melius. sed est certa quaedam illa Muci ratio atque sententia, est illa etiam Philippi, et cum sit necesse servire tempori et non amittere tempus cum sit datum. sed in hoc ipso habent tamen idem fasces molestiam. sit enim nobis amicus, quod incertum est, sed sit; deferet triumphum. +non accipere ne periculosum sit,+ invidiosum ad bonos. 'O rem' inquis 'difficilem et inexplicabilem!' atqui explicanda est. quid enim fieri potest? ac ne me existimaris ad manendum esse propensiorem quod plura in eam partem verba fecerim, potest fieri, quod fit in multis quaestionibus, ut res verbosior haec fuerit, illa verior. quam ob rem ut maxima de re aequo animo deliberanti ita mihi des consilium velim. Navis et in Caieta est parata nobis et Brundisi. [7] sed ecce nuntii scribente me haec ipsa noctu in Caleno, ecce litterae Caesarem ad Corfinium, Domitium Corfini cum firmo exercitu et pugnare cupiente. non puto etiam hoc Gnaeum nostrum commissurum ut Domitium relinquat; etsi Brundisium Scipionem cum cohortibus duabus praemiserat, legionem ei Fausto conscriptam in Siciliam sibi placere a consule duci scripserat ad consules. sed turpe Domitium deserere erit implorantem eius auxilium. est quaedam spes mihi quidem non magna sed in his locis firma Afranium in Pyrenaeo cum Trebonio pugnasse, pulsum Trebonium, etiam Fabium tuum transisse cum cohortibus, summa autem Afranium cum magnis copiis adventare. id si est, in Italia fortasse manebitur. ego autem cum esset incertum iter Caesaris, quod vel ad Capuam vel ad Luceriam iturus putabatur, Leptam misi ad Pompeium (et) litteras; ipse ne quo inciderem reverti Formias. haec te scire volui scripsique sedatiore animo quam proxime scripseram, nullum meum iudicium interponens sed exquirens tuum.