Letter 109

[1] You want to know whether a wise man can be of use to a wise man. We say that the wise man is full of every good and has attained the highest; the question, then, is how anyone can be of use to one who already possesses the highest good. Good men are useful to one another. For they exercise their virtues and keep their wisdom in proper condition; each of them wants someone with whom he can compare notes, with whom he can pursue inquiry. [2] Practice keeps those skilled in wrestling sharp; a musician is roused by one who has learned equal skill. The wise man too needs his virtues to be kept in motion; and so, just as he sets himself in motion, he is set in motion by another wise man. [3] How will one wise man be of use to another? He will give him impetus, he will point out occasions for honorable action. Besides this he will express some of his own thoughts; he will teach what he has discovered. For there will always remain, even for the wise man, something for him to discover and toward which his mind may run out. [4] A bad man harms a bad man and makes him worse, inflaming his anger, assenting to his gloom, praising his pleasures; and bad men suffer their worst when they have most thoroughly mingled their vices and their wickedness has been pooled into one. By the opposite logic, then, a good man will be of use to a good man. "How?" you ask. [5] He will bring him joy, he will strengthen his confidence; from the sight of their mutual tranquillity the gladness of each will grow. Moreover he will hand over to him knowledge of certain matters; for the wise man does not know everything. And even if he did know everything, someone might think out shorter routes to things and point out paths by which the whole task is carried through more easily. [6] A wise man will be of use to a wise man, not, of course, only by his own powers, but also by those of the very man he helps. That man, to be sure, even when left to himself, can work out his own role: he will use his own speed, yet nonetheless a man cheering him on helps even the runner. "A wise man is of no use to a wise man, but is of use only to himself. That you may know this, take away from him his own native power, and he will accomplish nothing." [7] At that rate you might as well say that sweetness is not in honey; for the very man who is supposed to eat it, unless his tongue and palate are so adapted to that kind of taste that such a flavor takes hold of him, will be put off by it; for there are some men to whom, through the defect of a disease, honey seems bitter. Both parties must be sound, so that the one can be of use and the other can be fit material for one about to be of use to him. [8] "When something has been brought to the highest degree of heat," he says, "to heat it further is superfluous, and when something has been brought to the highest good, it is superfluous to have anyone be of use to it. Does a farmer equipped with everything seek to be supplied by another? Does a soldier under arms, equipped enough for one about to go out into the battle line, want any further weapons? Then neither does the wise man; for he is sufficiently equipped for life, sufficiently armed." [9] To this I reply: even one who has been brought to the highest degree of heat needs heat added so as to maintain the highest. "But heat," he says, "maintains itself." First, there is a great difference between the things you are comparing. Heat is a single thing; being of use is something varied. Next, heat is not helped by an addition of heat in order to be hot: the wise man cannot stand fast in the disposition of his mind unless he has admitted some friends like himself with whom he may share his virtues. [10] Add now that there is a friendship among all the virtues with one another; and so a man is of use who loves the virtues of one who is his equal and in turn presents his own to be loved. Like things give delight, especially when they are honorable and when men know how to approve and to be approved. [11] Even now, no one but a wise man can skillfully set in motion the mind of a wise man, just as no one but a man can set a man in motion rationally. As, therefore, reason is needed to set reason in motion, so for perfect reason to be set in motion there is need of perfect reason. [12] Those too are said to be of use who bestow on us the intermediate things, money, influence, security, and the other things dear or necessary for the uses of life; in these respects even a fool will be said to be of use to a wise man. But to be of use is to set the mind in motion in accordance with nature by one's own virtue. This will not come about, for the one who is to be set in motion, without a good also for the one who is to be of use; for of necessity, by exercising another's virtue, he exercises his own as well. [13] But even if you remove those things which are either the highest goods or the producers of the highest goods, wise men can nonetheless be of use to one another. For a wise man's finding of a wise man is in itself a thing worth seeking, since by nature every good is dear to the good man, and thus each is drawn to a good man just as he is drawn to himself. [14] From this question I must necessarily pass, for the sake of argument, to another. For it is asked whether the wise man is going to deliberate, whether he will call someone into council. This he must do when he comes to these civic and domestic and, so to speak, mortal matters; in these he needs another's counsel just as he needs a physician, a pilot, an advocate, and one who arranges a lawsuit. The wise man, therefore, will sometimes be of use to a wise man; for he will advise him. But in those great and divine matters too, as we said, he will be useful by handling honorable things in common and by mingling minds and thoughts. [15] Furthermore, it is in accordance with nature both to embrace friends and to rejoice in a friend's growth as in one's very own; for unless we do this, not even virtue will remain with us, which is strong by the exercise of perception. And virtue advises us to dispose well of what is present, to take counsel for the future, to deliberate and to apply the mind: one who has taken someone to himself will more easily apply and work out his thought. [16] Men say they see more in another's business +at the start+. This happens to those whom self-love blinds, and from whom fear in dangers shakes loose their clear view of advantage: a man will begin to be wise when he is more secure and set beyond fear. But nonetheless there are certain things which even wise men see more carefully in another than in themselves. Besides, the wise man will furnish to the wise man that sweetest and most honorable thing, "to will the same and to refuse the same"; he will lead an outstanding work under an equal yoke. [17] I have paid off what you demanded, although it belonged in the order of matters which we are gathering in the volumes of moral philosophy. Consider what I am wont to say to you often, that in these things we are exercising nothing but our sharpness. For I keep coming back to this: what does this matter do for me? Make me braver, juster, more temperate. There is not yet leisure to be exercised: I still need a physician. [18] Why do you demand of me a useless knowledge? You promised great things: show good faith. You were saying I would be fearless even if swords flashed around me, even if the blade's point touched my throat; you were saying I would be untroubled even if fires blazed around me, even if a sudden whirlwind snatched my ship over the whole sea: furnish me this care, that I may despise pleasure, that I may despise glory. Afterward you will teach me to untie knots, to distinguish ambiguities, to see through obscurities: now teach me what is necessary. Farewell.

You expressed a wish to know whether a wise man can help a wise man. For we say that the wise man is completely endowed with every good, and has attained perfection; accordingly, the question arises how it is possible for anyone to help a person who possesses the Supreme Good. Good men are mutually helpful; for each gives practice to the other’s virtues and thus maintains wisdom at its proper level. Each needs someone with whom he may make comparisons and investigations. Skilled wrestlers are kept up to the mark by practice; a musician is stirred to action by one of equal proficiency. The wise man also needs to have his virtues kept in action; and as he prompts himself to do things, so is he prompted by another wise man. How can a wise man help another wise man? He can quicken his impulses, and point out to him opportunities for honourable action. Besides, he can develop some of his own ideas; he can impart what he has discovered. For even in the case of the wise man something will always remain to discover, something towards which his mind may make new ventures. Evil men harm evil men; each debases the other by rousing his wrath, by approving his churlishness, and praising his pleasures; bad men are at their worst stage when their faults are most thoroughly intermingled, and their wickedness has been, so to speak, pooled in partnership. Conversely, therefore, a good man will help another good man. “How?” you ask. Because he will bring joy to the other, he will strengthen his faith, and from the contemplation of their mutual tranquillity the delight of both will be increased. Moreover, they will communicate to each other a knowledge of certain facts; for the wise man is not all-knowing. And even if he were all-knowing, someone might be able to devise and point out short cuts, by which the whole matter is more readily disseminated. The wise will help the wise, not, mark you, because of his own strength merely, but because of the strength of the man whom he assists. The latter, it is true, can by himself develop his own parts; nevertheless, even one who is running well is helped by one who cheers him on. "But the wise man does not really help the wise; he helps himself. Let me tell you this: strip the one of his special powers, and the other will accomplish nothing.” You might as well, on that basis, say that sweetness is not in the honey: for it is the person himself who is to eat it, that is so equipped, as to tongue and palate, for tasting this kind of food that the special flavour appeals to him, and anything else displeases. For there are certain men so affected by disease that they regard honey as bitter. Both men should be in good health, that the one may be helpful and the other a proper subject for help. Again they say: “When the highest degree of heat has been attained, it is superfluous to apply more heat; and when the Supreme Good has been attained, it is superfluous to have a helper. Does a completely stocked farmer ask for further supplies from his neighbours? Does a soldier who is sufficiently armed for going well-equipped into action need any more weapons? Very well, neither does the wise man; for he is sufficiently equipped and sufficiently armed for life.” My answer to this is, that when one is heated to the highest degree, one must have continued heat to maintain the highest temperature. And if it be objected that heat is self-maintaining, I say that there are great distinctions among the things that you are comparing; for heat is a single thing, but helpfulness is of many kinds. Again, heat is not helped by the addition of further heat, in order to be hot; but the wise man cannot maintain his mental standard without intercourse with friends of his own kind—with whom he may share his goodness. Moreover, there is a sort of mutual friendship among all the virtues. Thus, he who loves the virtues of certain among his peers, and in turn exhibits his own to be loved, is helpful. Like things give pleasure, especially when they are honourable and when men know that there is mutual approval. And besides, none but a wise man can prompt another wise man’s soul in an intelligent way, just as man can be prompted in a rational way by man only. As, therefore, reason is necessary for the prompting of reason, so, in order to prompt perfect reason, there is need of perfect reason. Some say that we are helped even by those who bestow on us the so-called “indifferent” benefits, such as money, influence, security, and all the other valued or essential aids to living. If we argue in this way, the veriest fool will be said to help a wise man. Helping, however, really means prompting the soul in accordance with Nature, both by the prompter’s excellence and by the excellence of him who is thus prompted. And this cannot take place without advantage to the helper also. For in training the excellence of another, a man must necessarily train his own. But, to omit from discussion supreme goods or the things which produce them, wise men can none the less be mutually helpful. For the mere discovery of a sage by a sage is in itself a desirable event; since everything good is naturally dear to the good man, and for this reason one feels congenial with a good man as one feels congenial with oneself. It is necessary for me to pass from this topic to another, in order to prove my point. For the question is asked, whether the wise man will weigh his opinions, or whether he will apply to others for advice. Now he is compelled to do this when he approaches state and home duties—everything, so to speak, that is mortal. He needs outside advice on such matters, as does the physician, the pilot, the attorney, or the pleader of cases. Hence, the wise will sometimes help the wise; for they will persuade each other. But in these matters of great import also,—aye, of divine import, as I have termed them,—the wise man can also be useful by discussing honourable things in common, and by contributing his thoughts and ideas. Moreover, it is in accordance with Nature to show affection for our friends, and to rejoice in their advancement as if it were absolutely our own. For if we have not done this, even virtue, which grows strong only through exercising our perceptions, will not abide with us. Now virtue advises us to arrange the present well, to take thought regarding the future, to deliberate and apply our minds; and one who takes a friend into council with him, can more easily apply his mind and think out his problem. Therefore he will seek either the perfect wise man or one who has progressed to a point bordering on perfection. The perfect wise man, moreover, will help us if he aids our counsels with ordinary good sense. They say that men see farther in the affairs of others than in their own. A defect of character causes this in those who are blinded by self-love, and whose fear in the hour of peril takes away their clear view of that which is useful; it is when a man is more at ease and freed from fear that he will begin to be wise. Nevertheless, there are certain matters where even wise men see the facts more clearly in the case of others than in their own. Moreover, the wise man will, in company with his fellow sage, confirm the truth of that most sweet and honourable proverb—“always desiring and always refusing the same things”: it will be a noble result when they draw the load “with equal yoke.” I have thus answered your demand, although it came under the head of subjects which I include in my volumes On Moral Philosophy. Reflect, as I am often wont to tell you, that there is nothing in such topics for us except mental gymnastics. For I return again and again to the thought: “What good does this do me? Make me more brave now, more just, more restrained! I have not yet the opportunity to make use of my training; for I still need the physician. Why do you ask of me a useless knowledge? You have promised great things; test me, watch me! You assured me that I should be unterrified though swords were flashing round me, though the point of the blade were grazing my throat; you assured me that I should be at ease though fires were blazing round me, or though a sudden whirlwind should snatch up my ship and carry it over all the sea. Now make good for me such a course of treatment that I may despise pleasure and glory. Thereafter you shall teach me to work out complicated problems, to settle doubtful points, to see through that which is not clear; teach me now what it is necessary for me to know!” Farewell.

[1] An sapiens sapienti prosit scire desideras. Dicimus plenum omnibono esse sapientem et summa adeptum: quomodo prodesse aliqui possit summumhabenti bonum quaeritur. Prosunt inter se boni. Exercent enim virtuteset sapientiam in suo statu continent; desiderat uterque aliquem cum quoconferat, cum quo quaerat. [2] Peritos luctandi usus exercet; musicum quiparia didicit movet. Opus est et sapienti agitatione virtutum; ita quemadmodumipse se movet, sic movetur ab alio sapiente. [3] Quid sapiens sapienti proderit? Impetum illi dabit, occasiones actionum honestarum commonstrabit. Praeter haec aliquas cogitationes suas exprimet; docebit quae invenerit. Semper enim etiam sapienti restabit quod inveniat et quo animus eius excurrat. [4] Malus malo nocet facitque peiorem, iram eius incitando, tristitiae adsentiendo, voluptates laudando; et tunc maxime laborant mali ubi plurimumvitia miscuere et in unum conlata nequitia est. Ergo ex contrario bonusbono proderit. 'Quomodo? ' inquis. [5] Gaudium illi adferet, fiduciam confirmabit;ex conspectu mutuae tranquillitatis crescet utriusque laetitia. Praeterea quarumdam illi rerum scientiam tradet; non enim omnia sapiens scit; etiamsi sciret, breviores vias rerum aliqui excogitare posset et has indicareper quas facilius totum opus circumfertur. [6] Proderit sapienti sapiens, non scilicet tantum suis viribus sed ipsius quem adiuvabit. Potest quidemille etiam relictus sibi explicare partes suas: utetur propria velocitate, sed nihilominus adiuvat etiam currentem hortator. 'Non prodest sapienti sapiens sed sibi ipse. Hoc <ut> scias, detrahe illi vim propriam et ille nihil aget.' [7] Isto modo dicas licet non essein melle dulcedinem; nam ipse ille qui esse debeat <nisi> ita aptatuslingua palatoque est ad eiusmodi gustum ut illum talis sapor capiat, offendetur;sunt enim quidam quibus morbi vitio mel amarum videatur. Oportet utrumque valere ut et ille prodesse possit et hic profuturo idonea materia sit. [8] '<Ut> in summum' inquit 'perducto calorem calefieri supervacuumest, et in summum perducto bonum supervacuum est <si> qui prosit. Numquidinstructus omnibus rebus agricola ab alio instrui quaerit? numquid armatusmiles quantum in aciem exituro satis est ulla amplius arma desiderat? Ergonec sapiens; satis enim vitae instructus, satis armatus est. ' [9] Ad haecrespondeo: et qui in summum <perductus est calorem> opus est caloreadiecto ut summum teneat. 'Sed ipse se' inquit 'calor continet. ' Primummultum interest inter ista quae comparas. Calor enim unus est, prodesse varium est. Deinde calor non adiuvatur adiectione caloris ut caleat: sapiens non potest in habitu mentis suae stare nisi amicos aliquos similes sui admisit cum quibus virtutes suas communicet. [10] Adice nunc quod omnibus inter se virtutibus amicitia est; itaque prodest qui virtutes alicuius paris sui amat amandasque invicem praestat. Similia delectant, utique ubi honesta sunt et probare ac probari sciunt. [11] Etiam nunc sapientis animum perite movere nemo alius potest quam sapiens, sicut hominem movere rationaliter non potest nisi homo. Quomodo ergo ad rationem movendam ratione opus est, sic ut moveatur ratio perfecta opus est ratione perfecta. [12] Prodesse dicuntur et qui media nobis largiuntur, pecuniam, gratiam, incolumitatem, alia in usus vitae cara aut necessaria; in his dicetur etiam stultus prodesse sapienti. Prodesse autem est animum secundum naturam movere virtute sua. Ut eius qui movebitur, hoc non sine ipsius quoque qui proderit bono fiet; necessest enim alienam virtutem exercendo exerceat et suam. [13] Sed utremoveas ista quae aut summa bona sunt aut summorum efficientia, nihilominus prodesse inter se sapientes possunt. Invenire enim sapientem sapienti perse res expetenda est, quia natura bonum omne carum est bono et sic quisqueconciliatur bono quemadmodum sibi. [14] Necesse est ex hac quaestione argumenti causa in alteram transeam. Quaeritur enim an deliberaturus sit sapiens, an in consilium aliquem advocaturus. Quod facere illi necessarium est cum ad haec civilia et domestica venituret, ut ita dicam, mortalia; in his sic illi opus est alieno consilio quomodomedico, quomodo gubernatori, quomodo advocato et litis ordinatori. Proderitergo sapiens aliquando sapienti; suadebit enim. Sed in illis quoque magnisac divinis, ut diximus, communiter honesta tractando et animos cogitationesquemiscendo utilis erit. [15] Praeterea secundum naturam est et amicos conplectiet amicorum auctu ut suo proprioque laetari; nam nisi hoc fecerimus, nevirtus quidem nobis permanebit, quae exercendo sensu valet. Virtus autemsuadet praesentia bene conlocare, in futurum consulere, deliberare et intendereanimum: facilius intendet explicabitque qui aliquem sibi adsumpserit. Quaeretitaque aut perfectum virum aut proficientem vicinumque perfecto. Proderitautem ille perfectus, si consilium communi prudentia iuverit. [16] Aiunthomines plus in alieno negotio videre +initio+. Hoc illis evenit quos amorsui excaecat quibusque dispectum utilitatis timor in periculis excutit:incipiet sapere securior et extra metum positus. Sed nihilominus quaedamsunt quae etiam sapientes in alio quam in se diligentius vident. Praetereaillud dulcissimum et honestissimum 'idem velle atque idem nolle' sapienssapienti praestabit; egregium opus pari iugo ducet. [17] Persolvi quod exegeras, quamquam in ordine rerum erat quas moralisphilosophiae voluminibus conplectimur. Cogita quod soleo frequenter tibidicere, in istis nos nihil aliud quam acumen exercere. Totiens enim illorevertor: quid ista me res iuvat? fortiorem fac me, iustiorem, temperantiorem. Nondum exerceri vacat: adhuc medico mihi opus est. [18] Quid me poscis scientiam inutilem? Magna promisisti: exhibe fidem. Dicebas intrepidumfore etiam si circa me gladii micarent, etiam si mucro tangeret iugulum;dicebas securum fore etiam si circa me flagrarent incendia, etiam si subitus turbo toto navem meam mari raperet: hanc mihi praesta curam, ut voluptatem, ut gloriam contemnam. Postea docebis inplicta solvere, ambigua distinguere, obscura perspicere: nunc doce quod necesse est. Vale. Seneca the YoungerThe Latin Library The Classics Page